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Abstract
There is little economic theory that supports designing compensation packages to 
include a market-traded component. Any contract based on tradable securities can 
potentially be replicated with non-tradable securities that would give the employer tighter 
control on the incentives and trading activities of the employee. Indeed, it seems 
paradoxical to compensate employees with tradable securities only to impose restrictions 
that prohibit them from taking advantage of the tradability feature. This thesis provides 
insights into the role and economic consequences of disclosures aimed at reducing the 
ability of employees to gain from insider trading.
To analyze the impact of compensating employees with tradable securities I use a 
principal-agent framework where insider trading is captured by the notion of contract 
renegotiation. In the first analytical piece I show that in certain situations allowing the 
agent to trade anonymously on his private information increases production and, more 
importantly, is socially desirable compared to the case where the agent’s trades are 
required to be publicly disclosed. The intuition for this result is that the bid-ask spread 
imposed by the market maker makes it costly for the agent to sell his shares and get full 
insurance if he shirks. The consequence of the positive incentive effects for the agent 
makes the overall economy better off.
In the second version of my model I attempt to capture the SEC notion of insider 
trading where a manager has material non-public information prior to trading his equity 
claims. In this piece I allow the agent to collect private information prior to his trading. I 
identify three information structures and compare the production in the economy where
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the agent gathers private information prior to trading, to a scenario where private 
information acquisition is prohibited. I show that it is not at all clear-cut that private 
information collection by employees is always detrimental to the firm. Rather, situations 
may arise where private information collection and insider trading by employees results 
in higher production in the economy and can be socially desirable. Hence the thesis 
attempts to provide some potential economic reasons for employees to be compensated 
with tradable securities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Although the potential for insider trading appears to be of significant concern to 
investors and regulators alike, it is an empirical fact that executives receive large 
fractions of their compensation in the form of tradable securities. Any contract based on 
tradable securities can in principle always be replicated with non-tradable securities that 
would give the employer tighter control on the incentives and trading activities of the 
employee. Indeed, it seems paradoxical to compensate employees with tradable securities 
only to impose restrictions that prohibit them from taking advantage of the tradability 
feature of their compensation packages.
Providing managers with instruments that can be traded opens up the possibility 
that a manager will take advantage of uninformed outsiders by engaging in insider 
trading based on his private information. One issue that this raises is that insider trading 
is “unfair” to outside investors. Another issue that arises due to the tradability feature of 
the manager’s compensation package is that the manager by trading his contract can 
reduce the risk component of his contract and this may weaken the incentives of his 
original contract. The traditional solution for the owner to elicit effort from the manager 
is to impose some risk in the compensation of the manager. If the manager can trade his 
contract through insider trading it is possible for the manager to sell the risky part of his 
contract and receive full insurance thereby reducing his motivation to exert effort. The 
focus of the thesis is not to examine whether tradable securities should be included in 
compensation packages, hence I do not examine the situation where employees are 
compensated with tradable securities but not allowed to trade them. Rather, I take the 
tradability of the compensation package for granted and concentrate on the role of
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disclosure requirements in alleviating the two problems identified above. Hence, in the 
two versions of the model, I study the impact of compensating employees with tradable 
securities and allowing them to trade these securities anonymously. The popularity of 
tradable securities for purposes of compensation due to the above issues is in itself an 
interesting area of research.
To analyze the tradability feature of compensation packages, I employ the general 
framework of the principal-agent model with the possibility of “renegotiation.” In 
particular, I utilize a model closely related to that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where 
they allow the principal to renegotiate with the agent and show that due to renegotiation 
the principal cannot induce high effort as a pure non-degenerate strategy. Rather, the 
agent randomizes between high and low effort with a certain probability, which creates 
inefficiency relative to the second best model. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allow the 
principal and the agent the possibility to change the initial contract once effort has been 
exerted. Changes occur only if no party is made worse off, and at least one party is 
strictly better off. In this thesis I adopt the concept of renegotiation to analyze the effect 
of insider trading on effort and production as insider trading gives the agent the potential 
to change his contract once the game has started and is hence analogous to renegotiation. 
However, my model differs from the traditional interpretation of renegotiation because I 
allow the agent the possibility to trade with a third party -  the market rather than the 
principal.
In the seminal Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) renegotiation model the only 
information asymmetry is the agent’s action choice, that is, information generated 
endogenously within the firm. In the model I develop, the agent has private information
8
about his action choice and his insider trading behaviour. With the possibility to engage 
in insider trading, the agent can include exogenous information from his interaction with 
the market into the relationship he has with the principal. In order to understand the effect 
of additional information asymmetry from engaging in insider trading on effort I use a 
simple version of the Glosten-Milgrom framework to solve for equilibrium prices in the 
market where allowing the agent to engage in insider trading creates information 
asymmetries. The market maker in the two versions of my model is concerned with 
earning zero expected profits in equilibrium and supports any Pareto improving solution 
consistent with that objective. The equilibrium price in the market is calculated as the 
market maker’s rational expectation of the agent’s effort choice. I analyze the impact of 
additional information asymmetry caused by including exogenous information through 
insider trading on the agent’s effort and production.
The opportunity to engage in insider trading based on private information arises 
naturally if employees are compensated with tradable securities. Tradable securities can 
in principle always be replicated with non-tradable compensation vehicles that give the 
owners tighter control without changing the incentives of the employees. Therefore I 
explore why compensation packages in general include tradable securities while at the 
same time regulators impose restrictions on employees’ trading of these securities. The 
regulation prohibiting the trading of compensation packages is paradoxical because 
compensating managers with tradable securities when these managers naturally have 
private information that could be valuable for trading as they are closely involved with 
the day-to day running of the firm results in a conflict. In the second version of my model
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I analyze a situation where employees are compensated with tradable securities and study 
the impact of private information acquisition on the employee’s action choice.
The main result of the thesis shows that by compensating employees with tradable 
securities and allowing employees to engage in insider trading under certain parameter 
values results in an increase in production. By including an additional source of 
information asymmetry through the mechanism of insider trading, the probability of 
(desirable) high effort as opposed to (undesirable) low effort in certain situations is 
greater than in situations without this additional information asymmetry.
This second version of the model extends the first in a manner consistent with the 
SEC notion of insider trading by allowing the agent to acquire additional private 
information that is correlated with the liquidation value. This extension enables me to 
highlight the desirable properties of private information to add to the disclosure 
regulation debate. The increase in production observed in the first version of my model is 
even more pronounced when the employee is allowed to collect private information 
relevant to his trading prior to engaging in insider trading. I identify three possible 
information structures that capture different properties of accounting information related 
to the valuation and stewardship roles that accounting information possesses. I show that 
especially when the private information collected by the agent has a valuation role it 
leads to an increase in production. These seemingly counterintuitive results hint at a 
potential (economic) reason for the popularity of tradable securities in compensation 
packages. Hence in situations where employees are compensated with tradable securities, 
the owners would prefer a regime that does not require disclosure of management’s 
trading activities.
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The approach in my thesis differs significantly from previous research where the 
results for the benefit of insider trading are derived from the liquidity traders being ripped 
off. The focus of this thesis is not on reallocation mechanisms but the benefits of insider 
trading that arise from an increase in total economic output. My model is not about 
allocation issues; rather, it is about defining the Pareto frontier through the amount of 
production in the overall economy. In the two versions of the model I also do not attempt 
to characterize the optimal arrangement between the shareholders and the employee; 
rather, I identify Pareto improvements that can be implemented since all parties benefit 
from it.
The key policy issue that I explore with this thesis is whether or not managers that 
hold tradable securities should disclose ahead of time their intentions to trade (sell in 
particular) thereby revealing at least a portion of their private information, or if it could 
actually be preferable to allow them to take full advantage of the tradability feature by 
trading their compensation on the market anonymously. Indeed, I demonstrate in my 
model that it actually can be better, both in terms of real production, and in a Pareto 
sense, to allow the manager under certain parameter values to take full advantage of the 
tradability feature of his compensation and, thus, engage in insider trading. Current 
accounting debates revolve around the argument that there should be regulation for 
companies to publicly disclose management shareholdings, stock options as well as any 
changes in the holdings of top management. My thesis directly addresses this issue by 
showing that there are certain situations where allowing executive shareholdings to be 
private information may increase the productivity of the manager and may hence be 
socially desirable.
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The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 briefly describes the relevant 
theoretical and empirical research on insider trading and how it relates to my thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides the first version of my model where the impact of allowing the agent 
to trade his compensation on the market is examined. Finally Chapter 4 gives the second 
version of my model where I examine the impact of the allowing the agent to gather 
private information relevant to the liquidation value of the firm prior to making his 
trading decisions.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review On Insider Trading
In this chapter I provide an overview of both the existing theoretical and empirical 
literatures that have examined insider trading. The theoretical literature on insider trading 
can be divided into two main strands -  one strand explains the capital market effects of 
insider trading while the other strand looks at theoretical explanations for allowing 
managers to trade on their private information. The empirical literature on the whole 
looks at the capital market effects such as and market reactions caused by insider trading 
especially changes in the stock price. The two models that I have developed attempt to 
contribute to the second strand of the theoretical literature. The models endeavor to give 
another possible theoretical explanation for the existence of insider trading through a 
limited commitment principal-agent model where the agent is compensated with tradable 
securities and allowed to renegotiate his contract through trading with the market. 
THEORETICAL
There exists an extensive debate around the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) regulation of insider trading. In general, proponents of insider trading regulations 
argue that insider trading is harmful because it leads to (i) a loss of liquidity in the 
market, (ii) perverse managerial incentives, and (iii) a perception of unfairness and loss 
of investor confidence in capital markets (see Glosten (1989), Easterbrook (1985), 
Brudney (1979), Douglas (1988) and Manove (1989)). Opponents of insider trading 
regulations cite various social benefits associated with insider trading. One prominent 
argument is that trading by insiders with superior information leads to more 
informationally efficient stock prices. This is because insider trading helps security prices 
adjust more rapidly to reflect underlying information, hence increasing market efficiency
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and resulting in more real investment. Manne (1966) and Young (1985) in their papers 
give positive opinions that show that permitting insider trading would make the market 
more efficient and liquid, hence stimulating market investment. They also show that 
insider trading provides a meaningful form of compensation in large corporations for the 
entrepreneurial function; therefore it is an effective way of stimulating entrepreneurial 
activities. The main point in these articles favoring insider trading is that the social 
benefit of more efficient prices facilitate more efficient allocation of resources.
The merits of insider trading have been debated on two levels -  (i) Is it “fair” to 
have trading when individuals are differentially informed? (ii) Is it economically efficient 
to allow insider trading? The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 justifies the regulation of 
insider trading on the presumption that such activity is “unfair” to outside investors (see 
for e.g. Brudney (1979)). Critics point out that trading is always unfair whenever one part 
has an information advantage over another. One observation to note is if the uninformed 
party knows that they are uninformed, it is paradoxical to term their trades as “unfair” as 
they choose to trade their shares. Because there is no commonly accepted definition of 
“unfair,” this aspect of insider trading is not directly addressed. But the second aspect of 
insider trading, its impact on economic efficiency and welfare is more susceptible to 
economic analysis. One can show which parties gain, which lose, and how much is 
gained or lost. When the sum of the various gains and losses can be associated with 
economic welfare, the analysis can provide a measure of the net benefits that result from 
prohibiting insider trading.
To understand the nature of the current debate, it is important to review the 
common arguments referred to pro and con insider trading. Some of the arguments pro
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insider trading state that insiders will bring new and useful information into asset prices 
which will result for decision makers in reducing risk and improving performance as 
prices reflect better information. Also, due to reduced risk, asset prices will be higher and 
more real investment will occur. The model I develop contributes to this strand of 
literature by looking at the resulting production from allowing managers to engage in 
insider trading. Some of the arguments against insider trading are that outside investors 
will invest less because the market is “unfair.” Asset prices will be lower and less real 
investment will occur. Another common argument is that market liquidity will be 
reduced; thereby disadvantaging traders who must trade for reasons other than 
information. Also, insider trading will cause prices to be more volatile, further hurting the 
liquidity traders. I will first proceed to look at the analytical papers that give various 
stories for and against insider trading, and then examine the evidence put forward by 
several empirical papers.
There are several theoretical papers such as Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), 
Douglas (1988), Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Kyle 
(1985), Manne (1966), Radner (1979), and Young (1985) that show that insider trading is 
unfair to ordinary traders if those who trade on inside information obtain significantly 
larger profits than those expected. Grossman (1976) viewed stock prices as aggregating 
various kinds of information. Radner (1979) proposed efficiency of information; his 
model included the possibility of different traders possessing different knowledge. 
Hellwig (1980) showed that common information elements would be reflected in prices 
and that “noise” would be filtered out. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Kyle (1985) and 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that prices only partially reflect the diverse sources
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of information that traders possess. I will now proceed to examine in detail some of the 
theoretical arguments put forward in some of these papers. I first look at the papers that 
show theoretically that insider trading could generate some positive effects and then look 
at those papers that demonstrate that insider trading could have potential detrimental 
effects.
Ronen (1977) examines the possible effects of insider trading rules on the 
incentives for firms to produce and disseminate information about themselves. He 
contrasts in a theoretical model the incentives to produce and disseminate information in 
a market free of insider trading rules and a market with existing insider trading rules. 
Hence, he is able to examine the incremental effect of insider trading rules on the 
incentives for managers. He shows that the net effect of insider trading rules will most 
likely inhibit the generation, processing and communication of inside information. This 
deterrence of the production and dissemination of inside information then leads to the 
less efficient allocation of resources. The main argument in his paper is that the existence 
of rules can have an impact on the manner of impounding information in securities prices 
and thus on the pattern of wealth distribution. In the absence of insider trading rules, 
insiders can privately benefit from their information advantage whereas under existing 
rules, the benefits will be accrued to the existing shareholders.
The focus of Ronen’s (1977) paper is similar to the second version of my model, 
in the sense that the second version looks at how private information acquisition by the 
manager impacts his trading strategies. But, the models differ in that I do not examine the 
incentive for acquiring information, rather I assume in the second version that as the 
private information is correlated to the stock price of the firm, the manager has an
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incentive in acquiring it. In addition, I also examine the incentives for the principal in 
allowing the agent to acquire information when there is a cost to its acquisition whereas 
Ronen (1977) does not take into account the cost of information production and 
dissemination in his model.
Leland (1992) examines how insider trading contributes in resolving uncertainty. 
He uses a rational expectations model with an endogenous investment level and 
differentially informed investors to show that when insider trading is permitted stock 
prices better reflect information and will be higher on average, expected real investment 
will rise, markets will be less liquid, owners of investment projects and insiders will 
benefit and outside investors and liquidity traders will be hurt. He also shows that total 
welfare may increase or decrease depending on the economic environment.
A main contribution of his paper is that it endogenizes the number of shares 
issued as well as the real investment. In addition his model examines the impact of 
reduced future price volatility on the level of current asset prices. He suggests that insider 
trading may be undesirable even when investment is flexible, and risk-averse outsiders 
behave competitively and cannot alter their information. Liquidity of financial markets 
decrease when insider trading is allowed and liquidity traders suffer welfare losses. Total 
welfare in his model may increase or decrease with insider trading. Welfare will tend to 
increase when the amount of investment is highly responsive to the current stock price. 
In this case the gains from greater investment efficiency more than offsets the costs to 
outside investors and liquidity traders. If investment is inflexible to current stock price, 
net welfare tends to be lower when insider trading is permitted. His model also shows 
that asymmetric information is likely to impose greater welfare costs when the employees
17
of the firm have the information advantage rather than external investors. His results are 
in contrast to the one I generate in the first version of my model, where I show that 
production efficiency increases when the employee is allowed to trade on his superior 
information.
In another theoretical paper, Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) look at voluntary 
disclosures and the trading behavior of insiders. Empirical evidence suggests that 
corporate insiders profit from trading on their superior information. These insiders may 
also influence a firm’s voluntary corporate disclosures. They consider a setting where 
non-insiders acquire information of less quality than that of the insider’s information. 
Consequently an insider’s trading profits are affected by the quality of his own private 
information as well as the behavior of other market participants. Their set-up follows the 
noncompetitive trading models of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) where 
the price of a single risky asset is set efficiently by a market maker based on all public 
information. Public disclosures reduce information asymmetry and alter the trading 
behavior of all informed traders, as in the presence of other informed traders the insider 
must compete for his share of the total available trading profits.
The main result of their paper shows that a public disclosure which reduces an 
insider’s private information advantage can actually increase his expected trading profits. 
This is contrary to the general notion that insiders can profit only from trading before the 
release of private information. The intuition underlying their result is that public 
disclosure of information creates a trade-off. While it is true that voluntary disclosures 
reduce the insider’s profits by dissipating some of his informational advantage, such
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disclosures also decrease the trading aggressiveness of other informed traders in a way in 
which it increases the insider’s profits.
The model that I develop in this thesis differs from this paper as I embed a 
Glosten-Milgrom (1985) market model in a standard principal-agent moral hazard 
problem. In the two versions of my model I do not just analyze the prices in the market 
but also the contract offered to the manager by the firm as well as the production 
generated in the economy. In the economy that Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) examine, 
public disclosure affects both the aggregate trading (a size effect) and an individual 
trader’s shares of those profits (a share effect). While disclosure reduces the information 
advantage of all informed traders relative to the market maker, which decreases the total 
size of the trading profits by increasing the market depth, disclosure also increases the 
competitive advantage of the insider relative to any remaining informed traders, and in 
equilibrium reduces the number of other informed traders. The latter two effects lead to 
increasing the insider’s share of the available trading profits both by allowing him to 
trade more aggressively relative to other informed traders and by reducing the number of 
informed competitors. The Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) paper analyzes how 
mandatory disclosure affects insider’s trading profits, while in the two versions of my 
model, the insider i.e. the manager does not make excess profits by trading, rather I 
examine the production or real effects generated by different scenarios.
The two versions of my model are also related to a theoretical paper by Dye 
(1984), where he analyzes shareholders’ incentives to sanction insider trading. Dye 
(1984) uses a multiple principal-single agent model with full commitment with the 
manager’s trades observable ex-post. He establishes improved risk-sharing as one of the
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reasons shareholders would want to allow the manager to trade on his private 
information. In his paper the desirability of insider trading depends on the distributional 
relationships among the inside information held by management, the manager’s effort, 
and the output of the firm that employs him. Under certain distributional assumptions 
both the manager and the firm’s owners may achieve strictly higher utility by allowing 
the manager some discretion in the selection of his compensation schedule than they 
would obtain if the manager were not given such discretion. This discretion in contract 
selection allows the manager to “communicate” his private information to the firm’s 
owners. Insider trading is shown to be one such way in which discretion can be granted to 
the owners.
His model uses the assumption that the private information of the manager is so 
informative that the realized value of output contains no information about the manager’s 
actions not contained in the manager’s private signal. Providing the right incentives to the 
manager to reveal his private information truthfully leads to the improved risk-sharing 
result that drives the gain from allowing insider trading. The benefit of offering a menu to 
the manager only exists if the manager’s private information is not independent of the 
realized output. In the Dye (1984) model trading by the manager reveals his private 
information which then allows the shareholders to compensate him accordingly. In the 
two versions of my model the insider trading by the manager does not reveal his private 
information; in fact I examine the effect of allowing the manager to engage in anonymous 
insider trading. In the versions of my model I demonstrate that under certain parameter 
values allowing the manager to engage in anonymous insider trading can lead to an 
increase in the production of the firm compared to a scenario where the manager is not
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allowed to engage in such anonymous trading. Hence in my models it is essential that the 
private information of the manager be private and is not revealed to the shareholders or to 
the market through his insider trades for the shareholders to benefit from the production 
advantages.
John and Mishra (1990) model trading by corporate insiders as a signal that 
interacts with corporate announcements such as capital expenditures, equity issues and 
repurchases, dividend announcements and can hence be used to explain price reactions of 
these announcements. In particular, they show that such interactions of corporate 
announcements and concurrent insider trading depends crucially on whether a firm is a 
growth firm, a mature firm or a declining firm. In the underlying efficient signaling 
equilibrium, investment announcements and insider trading convey private information of 
insiders to the market at least cost. In the two versions of the model I develop the 
portfolio holding of the insider (agent) is revealed to the investors (principal) prior to the 
insider receiving his cash bonus. Hence, in my model insider trading serves as a signal of 
the agent’s effort level to the principal. However, the principal is unable to use this 
information ex-post because with renegotiation the principal in equilibrium writes a 
contract that is renegotiation proof and hence commits not to ex-post use the information 
generated at the renegotiation stage.
Paul (1992) develops a model to show the effectiveness of stock based 
compensation in providing incentives for managers to work hard and effectively. He 
shows that there is a fundamental conflict between aggregating information to assess 
value and aggregating information for the incentive problem. This conflict can have 
important effects on the operations of the firm. Intuitively, investors are interested in a
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signal to the extent that it resolves uncertainty about the firm’s ultimate payoffs. The 
more uncertainty it resolves ‘the more weight the signal receives. However, the principal 
is more interested in a signal that accurately measures the agent’s unobservable effort. 
When the market can observe the profitability of all projects with equal precision, with 
stock-based compensation the weight of any given project in managerial compensation is 
independent of the marginal productivity of effort in the project. Also, the projects that 
are the noisiest indicators of managerial effort receive the most weight in compensation. 
Lastly, he finds that investors have the greatest incentive to collect information about 
projects that are the noisiest indicators of managerial effort.
Paul (1992) is similar in some regards to the second version of my model. In that 
model I show how private information collection by the agent can be useful to the 
principal and discuss its implication to outside investors as well. However, in my model I 
do not examine whether the investors can collect information. Even though the Paul 
(1992) paper and mine look at the effects of signals in a scenario where the agent is 
compensated with tradable securities, they differ significantly in that he looks at two 
types of information -  value relevant and effort relevant whereas in my model I examine 
the implications of the private information that the agent collects on his effort choice.
In a related theoretical paper, Dow and Rahi (2003) show another benefit to 
allowing insider trading. They study the welfare economics of informed stock market 
trading. Their model shows that a greater degree of informed trading reduces the returns 
to speculation. They also prove that greater revelation of information that agents wish to 
insure against, leads to a reduction in hedging opportunities, but early revelation that is 
uncorrelated with hedging needs allows agents to construct better hedges. They
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demonstrate an important welfare gain due to the existence of insider trading. Their main 
result intuitively stems from the fact that informed trading increases investment 
efficiency, even though it entails higher volatility of the share price and of investment. 
The production efficiency gains in the two versions of my model come from increasing 
the market inefficiencies through an increased bid-ask spread whereas the economic 
benefits in Dow and Rahi (2003) comes from a decrease in market inefficiencies.
Looking at the potential detrimental effects of insider trading, Manove (1989) 
examines the harm from insider trading and informed speculation. He examines the fact 
that insiders and other speculators with private information are able to appropriate some 
part of the returns to corporate investments made at the expense of other shareholders. As 
a result, insider trading tends to discourage corporate investment and reduce the 
efficiency of corporate behavior. He then provides measures that give some indication of 
the sources and extent of the investment reduction. Manove (1989) looks at the fact that 
corporate shareholders support corporate investments because their shares convey the 
rights to the proceeds of those investments. Suppose corporate investments are risky and 
outsiders need to sell their shares before the outcome of the investments are realized. If 
insider trading exists, then future outsiders knowing themselves to be subject to adverse 
selection will be unwilling to pay for the full expected value of the unrealized 
investments. This means that the incumbent shareholders will not be able to recover the 
full expected value of the returns to corporate investments. As a result, insider trading 
will tend to dampen shareholder support for corporate investments. If outsider 
shareholders control corporate behavior, then corporate investment will tend to fall below 
its economically efficient level. The main result of the model that Manove (1989)
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develops is that the more often the average outsider trades, the smaller the effects of 
insider trading will be. When corporate investment is inherently risky, insider trading 
induces corporate investment. But when corporate investment is less risky, insider trading 
can, in principle, lead to corporate overinvestment.
Fishman and Hagerty (1992) analyze the effect of insider trading on the 
informational efficiency of stock prices in an imperfectly competitive market. They show 
that with insider trading, the aggregate amount of information processed by traders leads 
to less efficient stock prices. This is because insider trading in their model has two 
adverse effects on stock price efficiency. First, with insider trading, the number of 
informed traders is lower -  the presence of better informed insiders deters non-insiders 
from acquiring information and trading. They show that in the extreme, there are no 
informed traders in the market and the market becomes extremely illiquid. Second, in 
their model, due to the presence of insider trading in the market, the informational 
advantage is not evenly distributed in the market. Both these effects lead to markets being 
less competitive and to less efficient prices. Hence in their paper, they stress upon the 
negative effects of allowing insider trading.
In a later paper, Fishman and Hagerty (1995) examine the fact that financial 
market regulations require various insiders to disclose their trades ex-post (i.e. after the 
trades are made). Their paper analyzes the effects of such mandatory disclosure rules on 
the operation of a market. Contrary to the general opinion that more public information 
concerning the trades of insiders limits the ability of insiders to profit on the basis of their 
superior information, they show that mandatory disclosure of insider’s trades can increase 
the expected trading profits for the insider relative to a market without disclosure. This
24
increase of profit for the insider in their model comes at the expense of non-insiders who 
trade at a wider bid-ask spread making the market less liquid. Thus, mandatory disclosure 
can make insiders better off and non-insiders worse off. The results are generated by the 
market’s inability to observe an insider’s motive for trading, which combined with 
mandatory disclosure, leads to profitable trading opportunities for insiders even though 
they may possess no fundamental information. The general intuition for their result is that 
with disclosure, an uninformed insider can manipulate the market because the disclosure 
of one more trade moves the prices and creates profitable subsequent trades. This is the 
main reason why an insider’s expected trading profits can be higher with mandatory 
disclosure.
The aspect of an increase in the spread is similar in spirit to the first version of my 
model. In my model though the increase in the bid-ask spread generates a Pareto 
improvement over the case where there is no spread introduced in the model, due to the 
increase in production. In the Fishman and Hagerty (1995) model, the results are 
generated due to the inability of the market maker to observe an insider’s motives for 
trading, which combined with mandatory disclosure, leads to profitable trading 
opportunities for insiders even if they possess no fundamental information. In their 
model, an insider can trade due to superior information or for liquidity reasons. In the two 
versions of the model that I develop, the insider trades only to take advantage of the 
superior information that they have and do not trade for liquidity or portfolio 
readjustment reasons.
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) in their paper attempt to establish a link between 
the nature of the capital market from which a firm secures its investment funds, the firm’s
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chosen level of financial disclosure, the firm’s cost of capital, the extent of its residual 
agency problems and the extent of insider trading in its shares. In their model, the costs 
and benefits associated with disclosure are endogenous. The nature of the capital market 
in their paper is characterized by the potential liquidity needs of investors from whom 
capital is raised. The level of disclosure in their model is determined by trading off the 
production efficiency effect and the compensation subsidy effect, both of which fall with 
increased disclosure, against a market illiquidity effect and its effect on the cost of 
capital, both of which also fall with increased disclosure. Production efficiency falls 
because more disclosure means less information about the manager’s action is 
impounded in price, so that price-based performance measure becomes less efficient, 
agency problems increase and output falls. The compensation subsidy in their model falls 
because more disclosure reduces the manager’s insider trading profits, thereby reducing 
the market subsidy associated with hiring and paying the manager. Market illiquidity and 
the cost of capital fall because more disclosure encourages investment by individuals who 
may have future liquidity needs. Thus, as investors’ potential liquidity needs increases, 
the cost of capital decreases, the expected profits of insider trading decrease, and the 
manager’s residual moral hazard problem increases.
Their paper is similar to mine in the sense that they impose a Kyle (1985) type 
market equilibrium process in a standard principal-agent moral hazard problem. In 
addition, similar to their paper, I examine the production effects of allowing the agent to 
engage in insider trading. However, their interpretation of trading remains different from 
mine. In my models I turn to the renegotiation literature to provide a framework to study
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insider trading as the renegotiation literature establishes the results that are obtained when 
the parties can change the contract once the game has begun.
In another strand of the theoretical literature Huddart, Hughes, Levine (2001) 
offer a rationale for contrarian trading. They study the effect of trade disclosure on the 
dynamic trading strategy of informed insiders. They show that an insider earns the same 
expected profit and dissipates a constant amount of his private information in every 
trading round. This is achieved by the insider including a random noise component in 
every trade. The random component may be a buy or a sell. The insider in their model 
trades the sum of this quantity and an information-based component. However, in the last 
round of trading the insider’s strategy places strictly positive probability on all trade 
quantities, both buy and sell, irrespective of the insider’s information. This strategy 
enables the insider to balance immediate profits from informed trades against the 
reduction in future profits following trade disclosure and hence some revelation of the 
insider’s private information. They provide a rationale for contrarian trades -  
dissimulation which may underlie insiders’ trading activities. This paper differs 
substantially from the versions of the model I develop as the focus of this paper is the 
dissemination of the private information that an insider possesses. In my model, the focus 
is on the impact on effort and production of the firm due to compensating employees with 
trading securities and allowing them to engage in insider trading.
Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) present a model in which the parameter 
spaces under which entrepreneurs and society would want to impose restrictions on 
insider trading are different. When a manager is allowed to trade on his inside 
information he competes with the informed outsider which then reduces the expected
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profits of the outsider and leads to a reduction in the equilibrium quality of the outsider’s 
information. This leads to a reduction in the amount of information the insider uses in 
allocating resources and it affects the liquidity of the secondary market. Both affect the 
initial offer price. Less outside search lowers the initial offer price since the potential 
liquidity traders, expecting to lose less to outsiders in the secondary market, are willing to 
offer a higher price. As the entrepreneur contracts on compensating with the insider, it 
allows the entrepreneur to capture the insider’s expected trading profits by paying a lower 
contractual wage. This aspect is similar in my model as well as the investors in the firm 
only pay the agent his reservation wage, they appropriate the gains from the higher 
production of the firm. However, in the Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) model 
because the entrepreneur cannot contract with the outsiders, the outsider’s profits will 
reduce the offer price. Given the tradeoff between resource allocation and the relevant 
portions of the insider’s and outsiders’ trading profits, an entrepreneur favors insider 
trading whenever the net effect on the initial offer price is positive. A social planner 
however only cares about the value of the outside information relative to its cost.
Below I briefly describe some of the empirical literature on insider trading. 
E M PIR IC A L:
Several empirical papers provide evidence of insider trading in the securities 
market. Most of these papers use event studies to analyze the impact of insider trading on 
stock and other market prices. Researchers compare the average profits of traders to the 
profits of trades by registered insiders, attempting to identify inside information value as 
abnormal trading gains achieved by insiders. The results have been inconsistent. Early 
papers by Wu (1964), Lee and Solt (1986) have found no indication that insiders
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performed better than other traders. On the contrary, Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976) 
Penman (1982), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988) have found that insiders earned abnormal returns by trading on their privileged 
information. One of the major drawbacks of these empirical studies has been the lack of a 
control variable, hence, it is difficult to determine the nature and quality level of the 
inside information and precisely which traders directly or indirectly possess inside 
information.
Insiders can earn excess profit by either recognizing pricing errors made by 
outsiders or by having superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations. In the 
former case, insiders trade against current investor sentiment, recognizing that outside 
investors make valuation errors through the application of inferior valuation models 
and/or the incorporation of biased judgments. In the latter case, managers have private 
information about the patterns of future cash flows. Because prices respond to 
unexpected changes in cash flow, insiders trade when their private information of future 
performance of unexpected cash flows differs from current market expectations. In both 
settings though, the general idea is that insiders help push prices towards fundamental 
value.
Prior research supports the hypothesis that insiders are contrarian traders. Sehyun 
(1992) in his paper shows that insiders are more likely to sell shares following periods of 
significant price appreciation, consistent with insiders trading in anticipation of 
subsequent price reversals. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that insiders predominantly 
buy shares in value firms and interpret this as evidence of insiders trading against the 
market’s over-reaction to past performance. Such trading behavior in general is consistent
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with insiders purchasing securities with high expected returns or the greatest amount of 
undervaluation (e.g. Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994)).
Three fairly recent empirical studies by Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Siri 
(1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) imply that insider trading leads to more 
rapid price discovery. These papers show that insider trading corrects prices significantly 
and in the right direction. All three papers use detailed data on trading by illegally 
informed insiders where the insider is a buyer. All three papers also use a measure of 
insider trading to estimate the impact of such trading on stock prices. Meulbroek (1992) 
uses an indicator variable to identify the days in which insider trading occurred. Cornell 
and Siri (1992) compute the fraction of total daily volume attributable to insiders, and 
Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) use daily and hourly insider trading volume. All the 
authors conclude that insider trading is significantly correlated with stock price run-ups 
implying that insider trades affect price discovery differently than non-insider 
(uninformed) trades. In a related paper Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) using the 
case-study of Boesky’s purchase of Carnation’s stock show that the effects of insider 
trading and non-insider trading (in the same direction) are statistically indistinguishable.
Another stream of empirical literature focuses on the impact on stock prices of 
legal trades by corporate insiders (Jaffe (1974), Sehyun (1986), Eckbo and Smith (1998), 
Sehyun (1992a), (1992b) and Ke, Huddart and Pettroni (2003)). These studies show that 
insiders tend to buy before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell before an abnormal 
decline. Sehyun (1992a) finds compelling evidence that insider trading volume, 
frequency, and profitability all increased significantly during the 1980s. Over the decade, 
he documents that insiders earned over 5% abnormal returns on average. Sehyun (1992b)
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determines that insider trades predict up to 60% of the variation in year-ahead returns. 
Accordingly he concludes that insider trading continues to be an economically important 
phenomenon.
Elliot, Morse and Richardson (1984) test whether the abnormal returns earned by 
portfolios which are constructed on the basis of the trading behavior of insiders are 
associated the public release of information about earnings, dividends, bond rating, 
mergers and bankruptcies. They find evidence that insiders increase purchases in the 12 
months before extreme earnings increases. However, their paper finds little evidence that 
insiders sell in advance of extreme earnings decreases, dividend changes or bond rating 
changes. Ke, Huddart and Pettroni (2003) in their paper show strong evidence that 
insiders anticipate earnings trends up to two years in the future and trade to profit from 
this information. Evidence points to interactions between legal constraints on trade and 
the timing of insider trades. They examine insider-trading patterns in advance of a break 
in quarterly earnings increases and find that insider sales increase three to nine quarters 
before the earnings break. They conclude that insiders trade ahead of earnings breaks, but 
do so several quarters ahead of the break so as to avoid the appearance of trading on near- 
term, material news about earnings.
Allen and Ramanan (1995) in their paper examine the link between reported 
insider trading and the information captured by annual unexpected earnings. They find 
that the slope of the coefficient when cumulative 15-month returns are regressed on 
annual unexpected earnings is highest for the group where insiders are net purchasers and 
the sign of the unexpected earnings is positive. Their results are consistent with the 
inference that insider buying interactively confirms the favorable information captured by
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positive unexpected earnings and this interaction reduces the noise in unexpected 
earnings. They find a similar but less pronounced effect in the group where insiders are 
net sellers and the sign of the unexpected earnings is negative. Their results support some 
of the theoretical work discussed above in showing that insider trading helps in 
conveying information not fully captured by that year’s earnings.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) in their paper look at stock price reactions to insider 
trade announcements. They observe very little market movement when insiders trade and 
report their trade to the SEC. The focus of their paper is longer-horizon returns and they 
also find evidence that insiders are contrarian investors and prefer to buy value stocks 
that have historically performed well. However, the paper shows that insiders’ trades 
predict market movements better than simple contrarian strategies and hence could be 
used as a tool to time the market as previously documented by Sehyun (1988, 1998). In 
addition, insiders seem able to predict cross-sectional returns. The result they find is 
driven by insider’s ability to predict returns in smaller firms. Also they find that the 
informativeness of insiders’ activities comes from purchases, while insider selling seems 
to have no predictive ability. In the models I develop, insiders reveal information only 
through the selling of their shares. Also, my models are constructed such that the agent 
(insider) who has taken the high-cost action is at his maximum utility when the principal 
offers him the original compensation and hence this type of agent has no incentive to 
change his contract through either purchasing or selling shares. It is only the agent who 
has taken the low-cost action that has an incentive to sell his shares and receive full 
insurance.
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In contrast, studies focusing on insider trading around short-window information 
events produce mixed results. For example, Givoly and Palmon (1985) are unable to 
document a link between insider trading profits and subsequent disclosure events 
(including earnings and dividend announcements). In a related paper, John and Lang
(1991) develop and test a model on insider trading around dividend announcement. They 
develop a signaling model and solve for the efficient equilibrium with endogenous insider 
trading. They find that insider trading immediately prior to the announcement of dividend 
initiations has significant explanatory power. For firms that have insider trading prior to 
the dividend initiation announcement, the excess returns are negative and significantly 
lower than for the remaining firms. Another implication is that dividend increases may 
elicit a positive or negative stock price response depending on the firm’s investment 
opportunities.
Noe (1999) examines insider trading around management forecasts of earnings 
and finds the trading patterns to be unrelated to the forecasted earnings news. Other 
empirical papers document evidence that managers profit by trading on the 
foreknowledge of corporate events, for example, Sehyun (1990) and Muelbroek (1992) 
look at mergers and acquisition activities, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) look at bankruptcy, 
Karpoff and Lee (1991) examine seasoned equity offerings, Lee et al (1992) looks at 
stock repurchases and Sehyun (1990) at takeover bids. Damodaran and Liu (1993) look at 
insider trades on the appraisal information of real estate investment trusts that choose to 
reappraise themselves. They examine the time that elapses between the appraisal and its 
public announcement. They find strong evidence that insiders buy after they receive 
favorable news and sell after they receive negative appraisal news, especially for negative
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appraisals. They also find that positive (negative) appraisals and net insider buying 
(selling) elicit significant positive (negative) abnormal returns for the appraisal period.
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) in their paper, document that insiders are both 
contrarians and processors of superior information. Their paper extends the prior research 
in two ways. First, they attempt to disentangle the source of insiders’ superior trading 
performance into two components -  trading against current investor sentiment and 
trading on the basis of superior cash flow information. The tests build on the 
methodology of Rozeff and Zaman (1998) to document whether incremental associations 
between insider trades and the various proxies for contrarian beliefs and future cash flow 
news exist, and provide evidence on the relative explanatory strength of each set of 
variables.
They find that each relation has incremental explanatory power, but information 
about superior cash flow changes explains a smaller portion of insider purchases than do 
proxies for security misevaluations. Second, the research design incorporates all trading 
activity, not just trading around information events or extreme earnings innovations. The 
sample consists of a broad set of ordinary performance innovations that are less likely to 
attract regulatory scrutiny than extreme performance innovations. They also use a long 
measurement window which increases the odds that the sample captures both the 
performance signals being used by the insiders as well as the transactions. In addition, the 
long window research design allows them to use sample proxies for unexpected earnings 
information at the time of the trade, increasing the power of the tests to detect 
hypothesized relations.
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Consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), they measure contrarian beliefs using 
two variables -  the firm’s book-to-market ratio and recent returns. To operationalize the 
insider’s information advantage about future cash flows, they use next year’s annual 
market-adjusted stock return, next fiscal year’s annual earnings innovation and the 
contemporaneous annual earnings innovation. In the tests they assume that these annual 
innovations represent unbiased proxies of future cash flow changes that are unexpected 
by market participants but are known by management at the time of insider trades. They 
find that insider trades are positively related to the firm’s future earnings performance 
(proxy for superior cash flow information) and positively related to the firm’s book-to- 
market ratio and inversely related to recent returns (proxy for trading against 
mise valuations).
Another recent strand of empirical literature looks at cross-country data to 
document evidence of the impact of insider trading. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 
(2005) use data for 100 countries for the years 1987-2000 to empirically test that insider 
trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders. They study whether 
analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. 
They focus on one element of information infrastructure, sell-side analysts. They build on 
three strands of literature. The first is theoretical research predicting that insider trading 
crowds out private information acquisition by outside investors (Fishman and Hagerty
(1992), Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994)). The second strand of literature examines 
responses to insider trading laws (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)). Lastly, they build on 
the literature that examines relations between legal regimes and financial market 
characteristics (Beck, Demirgu?-Kunt and Levine (2001,2003), Demirgtif-Kunt and
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Maksimovic (1998), La Porta et al. (1997,1998)). They document that both the intensity 
of analyst coverage (the average number of analysts covering followed by firms within a 
country) and the breadth of coverage (the proportion of domestic listed firms followed by 
analysts) increase after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. They further find that 
this increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country 
has previously liberalized its capital market. They also find that analyst following 
responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio 
of strong investor protections. Hence, their paper provides some evidence supporting the 
crowding out theory.
The merits of insider trading regulation have mostly focused on regulation as a 
way of placing investors on a more equal basis. The main idea being that outside investors 
that do not have access to private information are disadvantaged when trading with insiders. 
Opponents of insider trading regulation often cite improved resource allocation as one 
possible benefit of allowing insider trading, The fundamental question though that remains 
largely unexplored is why insiders are compensated with tradable securities. One possible 
explanation given by Dye (1984) is that by allowing managers discretion over their contract 
through insider trading improved risk sharing can be achieved. This thesis puts forward 
another possible benefit of allowing managers to engage in insider trading, namely increased 
firm production.
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Chapter 3; The Value of Asymmetric Information created by
Tradable Securities and its Implications for Disclosure
Abstract: While tradable securities remain a popular means of compensating managers, 
there is constant discussion on the need for tighter regulation, including disclosure 
requirements, to prevent employees from being able to gain from trading these securities 
based on their private information. The purpose of this chapter is to provide insights into 
the role and economic consequences of disclosures aimed at reducing the ability to gain 
from insider trading. Using the principal-agent framework and relying on the 
renegotiation literature to capture the concept of insider trading, I show that in some 
situations allowing the agent to trade anonymously on his private information increases 
production and, more importantly, is socially desirable compared to the case where the 
agent’s trades are required to be publicly disclosed. The intuition for this result is that the 
bid-ask spread imposed by the market maker makes it costly for the agent to sell his 
shares and get full insurance if he shirks. The consequence of the positive incentive 
effects for the agent makes the overall economy better off.
1. Introduction
In this chapter I develop a theory of, and study the effect of compensating 
employees with tradable securities on effort exertion and production in the overall 
economy. Even though there is much concern about employees trading on their private 
information, many firms continue to compensate employees with a large fraction of 
tradable securities. This chapter aims to identify a potential economic benefit to 
employers from compensating employees with tradable securities and allowing them to 
trade these securities anonymously. To study this problem, I utilize a principal-agent 
framework and rely on previous research on renegotiation to analyze the concept of
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insider trading. I also model a simple market with information asymmetry using a 
Glosten-Milgrom framework to determine the equilibrium price at which the agent can 
trade his shares. In this chapter do not attempt to characterize the optimal arrangement 
between the principal and the agent; rather, I identify Pareto improvements that can be 
implemented as all parties agree to it. The main result of this chapter shows that under 
certain parameter values in a model where employees are compensated with tradable 
securities, allowing them to engage in anonymous insider trading can potentially lead to 
greater production compared to a scenario where they are prohibited from engaging in 
insider trading. This thus suggests a potential economic reason for the popularity of 
tradable securities as compensation vehicles. This chapter contributes to the literature on 
the use of tradable securities in employee compensation packages, insider trading and the 
implication of additional information asymmetry created by insider trading in 
renegotiation models.
In this chapter I attempt to model the situation that is more descriptive of publicly 
traded companies, that is, that of diffused ownership, where the firm is owned by several 
atomistic shareholders who are residual claimants of the firm. As each “principal” only 
owns a claim to the residual value of the firm, it is natural to assume that each “principal” 
does not own or control a sufficiently large fraction of the firm himself to be able to offer 
to renegotiate with the agent. I term this situation of diffused ownership as having “weak 
principals.” Hence in the model that I present the only option for the agent to 
“renegotiate” the contract that he is originally offered is to trade his compensation with 
the market. That is, the agent can reduce his risk-exposure only by selling at prevailing
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(equilibrium) market prices some or all of the tradable securities with which he was 
initially endowed.
The main result of this chapter shows that if the agent is compensated with 
tradable securities, under certain parameter values the economy as a whole can be better 
off if the agent is allowed to engage in (unobservable) insider trading. By including an 
additional source of information asymmetry through the mechanism of insider trading, 
the probability of (desirable) high effort as opposed to (undesirable) low effort in certain 
situations is greater than in situations without this additional information asymmetry. 
Indeed as I show, the setting where an agent facing “weak principals,” modifies his 
contract by engaging in undisclosed insider trading may actually perform better than the 
setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where a “strong principal” is in control of re­
contracting. There is no way of theoretically assessing the size of the region where my 
model dominates that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), however, since there are parameter 
values where this domination occurs, it is unclear that always requiring managers to 
disclose their insider trades is beneficial to the economy. If the region of domination is 
large, then clearly regulation that prohibits anonymous insider trading could have an 
adverse impact on the economy.
This seemingly counterintuitive result that allowing for anonymous insider 
trading can benefit the economy hints at a potential (economic) reason for the popularity 
of tradable securities in compensation packages. The model also helps to understand that 
allowing for insider trading in firms that have diffused ownership in some cases is 
beneficial to the owners of the company as the probability of high effort exerted by the 
manager is higher than in a regime where management’s intent to trade has to be publicly
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disclosed. Hence in these situations the owners would prefer a regime that does not 
require disclosure of management’s trading activities.
The Pareto improvement in this model comes from an increase in expected 
production. More precisely, an agent faced with a choice between a low and a high 
productive action will choose to take the high one with a higher probability. The intuition 
for this result follows from the fact that when the agent trades his compensation with the 
market, the market maker, knowing that there are traders trading on private information, 
induces a bid-ask spread that makes trading on private information less beneficial. In 
equilibrium, if the agent has taken the high-cost action, he prefers to hold on to his shares 
whereas if he taken the low-cost action he is indifferent between holding and selling all 
his shares. The market maker is aware of the fact that insider trading occurs only on the 
sell side of the market. Hence by imposing a large enough spread through a high ask 
price and a low bid price, the market maker can insure himself of the losses he will incur 
by buying from insiders. As a result of having to sustain the increased ask price the 
incentives for taking the high-cost action are increased. As a result, in equilibrium, the 
agent takes the high-cost action with a greater probability leading to the increase in 
overall production. Hence, the chapter shows that under certain parameter values insider 
trading may be socially desirable.
Another result of this chapter is that the more noise traders that trade in a firm’s 
shares, the lower the bid-ask spread of the firm which then reduces the amount of 
discrimination by the market maker against the agent taking the low-cost action. Hence, 
the results suggest that the more liquid a firm is the more detrimental insider trading 
might be for that firm as the disciplining force of the market maker is lowered in these
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types of firms. Hence, regulation that prohibits insider trading could potentially adversely 
affect companies that are more liquid if employees are compensated with tradable 
securities.
In this chapter I do not attempt to characterize the optimal contract between the 
principal and the agent, rather I start out with a situation where the employees are 
compensated with tradable securities and determine a Pareto improvement. Hence I 
suggest a solution to a problem where employees are compensated with tradable 
securities and identify parameter values where allowing employees to engage in 
anonymous insider trading dominates compensating them with these securities and 
allowing for only public trading.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the 
background of the existing literature on insider trading, empirical and theoretical. 
Section 3.1 lays out the framework of the contract that the “weak principals” (firm) offer 
the agent in a simple setting where there are two possible outcomes and two possible 
levels of effort for the agent. Section 3.2 explains the structure of the market that exists 
for trading in the shares of the firm. Section 3.3 explicitly lays out the time line of the 
model. Section 4 gives the theoretical foundations of the model used in this chapter. It 
highlights the important results of the paper by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Section 5 
provides the analysis of the model in three parts -  Section 5.1 explains the importance of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) as an appropriate benchmark, Section 5.2 sets up an 
artificial benchmark where the market maker does not impose a spread and Section 5.3 
analyzes a regime where the market maker responds to the information asymmetry in the
46
market by imposing a spread. Section 6 concludes the chapter and offers some 
implications for accounting research.
2. Related Literature on Insider Trading
This chapter is closely related to a theoretical paper by Dye (1984), where he 
analyzes shareholders’ incentives to sanction insider trading. Dye’s paper differs from 
this one as he uses a multiple principal-single agent model with full commitment where 
he establishes improved risk-sharing as one of the reasons shareholders would want to 
allow the manager to trade on his private information. In his paper the desirability of 
insider trading depends on the distributional relationships among the inside information 
held by management, the manager’s effort, and the output of the firm that employs him. 
His model uses the assumption that the private information of the manager is so 
informative that the realized value of output contains no information about the manager’s 
actions not contained in the manager’s private signal. Providing the right incentives to the 
manager to reveal his private information truthfully leads to the improved risk-sharing 
result that drives the gain from allowing insider trading. The benefit of offering a menu to 
the manager only exists if the manager’s private information is not independent of the 
realized output.
On the other hand, this chapter establishes gains to trading on private information 
in a limited commitment model where due to diffused ownership, like in the Dye model, 
there are multiple principals. But these principals own only a small fraction of the firm, 
and hence do not own or control a sufficiently large fraction so as to be able to 
renegotiate with the agent. Hence in my model, the only option for the agent to
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renegotiate his original contract is to trade in the market. Unlike the Dye model, the 
benefit from insider trading is from increased production, while risk-sharing in the 
contract remains the same as in the full commitment literature.
Another important distinction between my model and that of Dye (1984) is that in 
Dye’s (1984) model the agent communicates or reveals his information through the 
mechanism of insider trading while in my model it is crucial that the private information 
that the agent posses is not revealed through his insider trades, hence what I examine in 
my paper is the impact on production of allowing anonymous insider trading. In my 
model, similar to Dye’s (1984) the manager’s trades are observable ex-post after the 
markets are closed but before compensation is paid to the manager, which is consistent 
with insider reporting requirements specified in section 16(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.
3.1 Model of the Firm
To study the implications of allowing for undisclosed insider trading and, in turn, 
providing a meaningful role for tradable securities in compensation packages, I analyze 
an extension of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model of renegotiation with moral 
hazard in agencies with some key differences. This extended model allows me to distil 
the effect of insider trading on the agent’s effort and in turn on production in the overall 
economy. In Section 5, I also explain why I consider the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
model to be an appropriate benchmark as it provides the results when the agent’s trades 
are required to be publicly disclosed.
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In particular, I consider a simple agency setting modeled after most publicly 
traded companies that have diffused ownership. In my model there is no central principal 
as in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model. Rather, I assume that there is a risk neutral 
set of “weak principals” (atomistic shareholders) that while being residual claimants of 
the firm, none of them owns or controls a sufficiently large fraction of the firm to have 
the power to offer to renegotiate with the agent.
As there is no central principal the contract is written by a board of directors who 
represent the shareholder’s interests. Since the group of shareholders is diverse, that is, it 
includes long-term as well as short-term shareholders it is not clear whose interest the 
board of directors act in. The instantaneous preferences of shareholders may not be a 
mandate of the board. Hence, I assume that the board of directors offer the agent a 
contract at the beginning of the game, and due to the myriad interests of shareholders, 
they choose not to renegotiate with the agent themselves, but rather allow the agent to 
renegotiate his contract with the market through insider trading. The agent here receives 
compensation in the form of cash and tradable securities and renegotiation, if it takes 
place, can only take the form of the agent trading his claims at prices set in the market. 
Hence in this model, as I formally show later, trading is analogous to renegotiation.
I examine a discrete model where the agent has only two levels of effort to choose 
from; high or Iowa e {ah,a l }. The choice of effort, in turn, affects the expected value of 
the firm by altering the probability distribution over final output to be realized, observed, 
and shared at the end of the game. Realized output is denoted by x e { H , L }  where H > L,
and the probability of outcome H  when the agent chooses effort a j is denoted by 
p j =Prob(x = H  \ a j ), where y = /,/i. By assumption, p h > p l . The agent’s utility
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function is assumed additively separable in utility for consumption, represented by the 
strictly increasing and concave function U (•) defined over the entire real line, and dis­
utility for “effort.” For notational simplicity the cost of the low effort is normalized to 
zero while the (incremental) cost of high effort is represented by C > 0 . As in the 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model, I will assume that the value of the high output and 
the effect of the agent’s effort on the probability that it materializes are so large that the 
principal wants to implement the high effort whenever possible. The probability of high 
effort induced by the randomization result is denoted by cr = Prob (a j = a h).
As the key focus of my analysis is on the economic consequences of insider 
trading, I assume that the agent has claims to the terminal (net) output of the firm. As 
usual, the contract between the principal and the agent can be written on what is 
observable, that is x , as well as on any messages the agent may choose to convey to the 
principal prior to the end of the game. In the benchmark setting of Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) the only private information the agent can (and does) communicate is the choice 
of effort. In the case considered here where the agent can (and does) alter his exposure to 
the firm through market transactions, he may also be induced to disclose his trading 
activities. Hence, the message space of the agent in this case includes his effort level and 
his trading activity.
Given the focus on insider trading it is useful to express the contract between the 
principal and the agent in terms of a cash component, denoted by B e {B * ,B 0}, and a 
claim to a fraction of the final output of the firm. With only two potential levels of 
output, this is without loss of generality. Assume that the principal pays an agent B * if 
he observes that the agent holds S*  risky shares to the expected terminal value of the
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firm and B° if he observes that the agent does not hold S*  shares in the firm at the 
liquidation date. In equilibrium the terminal payment from the principal to the agent is 
B * for an agent who holds shares in the firm (and thus has taken a h) and an agent who 
exerts a 1 will hold no shares in the firm and will receive B ° .
This assumption is consistent with the reasoning that the market in the firm’s 
shares closes before compensation is paid to the agent, which is consistent with insider 
trading reporting requirements specified in section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, and hence the trading of the manager are revealed to the principal. It is also 
similar to the assumption made in the paper by Dye (1984). Analytically this assumption 
allows the principal to pay the agent enough cash so that the agent receives his 
reservation utility. Also, since the agent’s portfolio holdings are revealed after the 
terminal value x  is realized, it does not alter the agent’s action choice or his trading 
choice at the “renegotiation” stage. Hence this assumption is without loss of generality.
This practice of conditioning the agent’s bonus not just on firm performance but 
also on the agent’s portfolio holdings is common in practice. For example, in a New York 
Times article, the author Leslie Wayne discusses that one way that Campbell Soup 
Company has responded to shareholder activism is by tying the executives’ compensation 
to the company’s performance and requiring that top officials have a certain portion of 
their net worth tied in Campbell stock.1 This is one example of many companies that pay 
bonus compensation conditional on their employees’ portfolio holdings. Hence, having 
B**  B° in the model is one way of capturing anecdotal evidence through the analytical 
structure.
1 Taken from the article “Campbell Revises Executives’ Rules” by Leslie Wayne published in New York 
Times on Tuesday October 12, 1993.
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The risky part of the contract at the beginning of the game consists of 8  * shares 
in the firm. If insider trading occurs, the agent purchases y/ shares in the open market at 
the ask price denoted by ASK  or sells as many as S *  shares in the open market at the bid 
price denoted by BID . In the model, I assume that insiders are not allowed to short-sell.2 
The contract is constructed such that the agent trades in such a manner that at the end of 
the period an agent who took ah holds S*  shares of the firm, where S*  is the fraction of 
the firm held by an agent facing a full commitment optimal contract which is the contract 
that is incentive compatible with that action. If the agent is given 8 * shares by the 
principal, in the equilibrium renegotiation-proof contract, the agent who exerts a h should 
not have an incentive to purchase or sell shares. Before the agent has chosen his effort 
and traded accordingly, the contract also must be individually rational such that the agent 
is indifferent between the expected utility from high and low effort and, thus, willing to 
randomize between them with a probability cr.
In this chapter I do not attempt to solve for the optimal contract that is awarded to 
the agent. As the risk-sharing between the principal and the agent in my model is the 
same as that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), I can rank the contracts in terms of the 
production they generate. In this chapter, I establish that when the agent is compensated 
with tradable securities and allowed to trade them anonymously, under certain parameter 
values, I can push out the Pareto frontier as benchmarked against Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990). If this contract that may or may not be optimal can demonstrate an increase in 
production, then this result will hold true for an optimal contract. Hence, I identify a 
Pareto improvement to the solution where employees are compensated with tradable
2 This is consistent with SEC rulings especially that of 10a-l generally referred to as the ‘uptick’ rule.
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securities and demonstrate one potential economic reason for the presence of a tradable 
component in compensation packages.
3.2 Model of the Market
This section explains the market structure imposed in the model in order to 
analyze the price at which the agent can trade his shares in the market. Similar to Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), I assume that there exists a single competitive risk-neutral market 
maker in the market. The market maker is uninformed and faces an adverse selection 
problem, as there are informed traders and liquidity traders in the market. Assume that 
the number of liquidity traders in the market equals L , made up of Ls liquidity sellers
and Lb liquidity buyers. To solve the problem of asymmetric information, caused by 
informed traders who in this case are agents who have already exerted effort, the market 
maker quotes a bid and ask price.
I assume that the market maker does not observe the order flow before setting 
competitive bid (sell) and ask (buy) prices and therefore he has an expected profit of zero 
in each period, which implies that the market maker cannot cross-subsidize over time. 
The bid price is termed as BID and the ask price is denoted by A S K , with BID < A S K . 
The market maker in my model is only concerned with earning zero expected profit in 
equilibrium and within this objective is wilting to set prices that support Pareto 
improving solutions. In addition to the spread set by the market maker, the unconditional 
expected value (and potential market price) of the firm when the agent has exerted 
a A(high effort) is denoted b y n h = p hH + ( 1 - p h) L . Similarly, the unconditional
expected value of the firm when the agent has exerted a1 (low effort) is denoted
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by 7ii = p lH  + (1 -  p l)L. The market maker sets prices at the expected value of the firm 
given the agent’s equilibrium level of effort.3
The modeling approach in this chapter differs significantly from that of previous 
literature in that I show that under certain parameter values insider trading can lead to an 
increase in production in the overall economy without any adverse effects and may hence 
be socially desirable. This increase in output can always be redistributed to the liquidity 
traders (as long as they are risk-neutral) who may incur losses when trading with insiders. 
Hence, in this chapter due to the increase in production caused by allowing the agent to 
trade with the market, there is scope for a Pareto improvement. This model is not about 
allocation issues, rather it is about defining the Pareto frontier through the amount of 
production in the overall economy.
3.3 Time-line of the Model
At t = 0 the agent is offered a contract by the diffused owners who have claims to 
the residual value of the firm consisting of S*  shares in the firm and a cash 
amount B e {B*,Bq }. At r = l the agent exerts action a e {ah ,a1} . Once the agent’s 
action choice is sunk, he has the option at t = 2 to readjust his compensation portfolio by 
trading the shares in the firm with the market. At t = 3 the value of the firm is realized 
and the agent’s portfolio is observed after the market in firm’s shares has closed. At the 
last stage of the gamer = 4, as the principal knows the agent’s share holdings, the 
principal pays the agent conditional on the agent’s share holdings he observes. The firm
3 This is a simplifying assumption. I could extend the market to also perform the function of information 
aggregation, but as this will only complicate the model without changing the results, hence the simpler 
version is used in this model.
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is liquidated and the proceeds are distributed among the residual claimants. The game is 
structured such that an agent that has no shares of the firm at the liquidation date has a 
preference for full insurance and hence is an agent who has exerted the low-cost action. 
On the other hand, an agent who continues to hold 8  * shares of the firm at the liquidation 
date is one that has taken the high-cost action. The timing of the game can be depicted by 
the following time-line:
At t = 0 P gives 
A a contract 
C consisting of 
8  * shares in the 
firm and cash 
amount 
B e { B * , B 0}
4. Theoretical Foundations of the Model
In this section I highlight the important features of the Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) model and then go on to explain in the next section why their model serves as an 
appropriate benchmark for the one I consider. The Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
renegotiation model allows me to look at how trading by the agent effects production. 
Specifically, the agent trading his contract with the market once his effort choice has 
been made is analogous to allowing the agent to renegotiate his contract. In the 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model the agent renegotiates his original contract with the 
principal whereas in my model the agent is allowed only to renegotiate his original
At t = 1 A 
exerts action 
a e {ah,a1}
At t = 2 A is 
allowed to 
readjust his 
portfolio 
according to C
At t = 3 terminal 
value of firm 
x  g  {H,L} is 
observed and A’s 
portfolio holdings 
are observed by P as 
the market in the 
firm’s shares is 
closed.
At t = 4 A is 
compensated 
according to 
the portfolio 
revealed and 
the firm is 
liquidated.
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contract through trading in the market. Hence, in my model I include a player in addition 
to the principal and the agent -  the market. But, in both the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
and my model, there is a lack of commitment created by the possibility of renegotiation 
(possibility of changing the original contract once the game has started). Information 
asymmetry is created in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model by the principal being 
unknown about the agent’s action choice and in my model by the principal being 
unknown about the agent’s action choice as well as his trading activities.
The Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model is structured such that the principal and 
the agent write a contract after which the agent exerts effort. At the next stage, that is, 
once the effort is sunk, the principal (in this case a “strong principal”) offers to 
renegotiate the contract by offering the agent a menu of contracts to choose from. The 
key difference in my model is that once effort is sunk, the agent has the opportunity to 
trade the shares in his original contract in the market and hence giving the agent the 
opportunity to include exogenous information from the market in his relationship with the 
principal. In the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model once the agent has chosen the 
contract, output is realized and the agent is paid according to the contract he has chosen 
which holds in my model as well.
In their paper Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) show that with the possibility of 
renegotiation the principal cannot induce non-trivial pure strategies in the effort provision 
of the agent. When the effort choice is not observed by the principal, the anticipation of 
renegotiation may eliminate all incentives for the agent. To avoid this result, the outcome 
of full insurance once the action is sunk must somehow be prevented. Avoiding this 
outcome is possible only if the principal remains unsure about which action the agent
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chose. If the principal knows for sure the agent’s action, he can determine exactly the 
expected value of the underlying investment and insure the agent thereby saving a risk- 
premium. However if the agent is randomizing his choice over several actions, the 
principal is put in a position of an asymmetrically informed insurer at the renegotiation 
stage (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). Hence, the complexity of the model comes from 
the fact that at the renegotiation stage the game switches from one of hidden action to one 
of hidden information.
The renegotiation stage in the game occurs after the agent’s effort has been 
exerted, hence depending on the effort that the agent has taken, the agent chooses from a 
menu of compensation contracts offered by the principal. At this point the game becomes 
a standard adverse selection problem, where, by choosing from the menu that the 
principal offers, the agent reveals his type -  here his effort choice. Two important 
observations must be made about the problem -  the agent’s cost of effort does not appear 
in the problem as it is a sunk at the renegotiation stage. Second, both types’ individual 
rationality constraints may be binding here (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)).
The principal offers a menu of contracts that solves the compensation-cost- 
minimization problem of extracting informational rent from the agent that exerted a1 
who wants to pretend that he is type a h. This is done by distorting the efficient allocation 
of type ah. The menu that the principal offers the agent contains a less than full 
insurance contract (risky contract) for the agent that exerted a h and a full insurance 
contract for the agent that exerted a1 (no distortion at the top). The menu of contracts 
offered by the principal is the same as in the standard full commitment model, except that 
the weights placed on them by the agent are different. Due to the randomization result,
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the probability of the agent exerting the high-cost action is less than one and the 
probability of the agent exerting the low-cost action is greater than zero. In this case the 
agent’s benevolence lies in the assumption that the agent will take the high-cost action 
with the highest probability to avoid losses in production.
To be a bit more formal with the notation, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) in the 
discrete case prove that the highest probability of high effort x  * (c) that can be sustained 
in equilibrium is such that
;c*(c) f t 'QD  1 f p ( e ) - p ( e )  '
1 -  X  *  (c) Kp(e ) ( l -  p(e));
where <fi(U) is the inverse function of the utility function U . This result shows that with 
the possibility of renegotiation, the principal cannot induce high effort as a pure non- 
degenerate strategy; rather the agent randomizes between high and low effort with a 
certain probability. As the agent gets his reservation utility whether he chooses the high 
or the low effort, he is indifferent between the two effort levels and hence it is presumed 
that the agent randomizes between them using x  * (c ) .
A point to note here is that only contracts that offer full insurance to type a1 can 
be renegotiation-proof. In addition, the contracts that are in the menu offered by the 
principal in this setting with renegotiation are exactly the same as the ones used to elicit 
high and low effort respectively in the full commitment model. The only difference 
between the full commitment model and the renegotiation model is that in the full 
commitment model the principal can induce a h with a probability one and (thus) a1 with 
probability zero. In the renegotiation case, the principal can at best induce mixed 
strategies where the agent randomizes between ah and a1 with a certain probability less
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than one. Hence, with renegotiation the probability of a1, which is greater than zero, 
represents a production and a Pareto loss relative to the full commitment case. In the 
sections that follow, I show that in my model where renegotiation takes place through 
trading in the market, a higher probability of high effort can be supported with the same 
contract menu when insider trading is allowed. Any model that can support a higher 
randomization of high effort without adverse risk-sharing will yield a Pareto 
improvement over the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model as it will be closer to the 
standard full commitment production.
5. Analysis
5.1 Full Disclosure Benchmark
While the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model differs from mine as there is a 
“strong principal” that has the ability to renegotiate directly with the agent, to evaluate 
the consequences of allowing for insider trading on private information I still use the 
results of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) detailed above as a benchmark. The reason this is 
the appropriate benchmark in my setting with atomistic shareholders is that the important 
feature supporting their analysis is not whether the principal is strong or weak. Indeed, as 
an alternative to the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) set-up, consider a model where 
shareholders are atomistic and individually “weak,” but where a manager’s trading in the 
stock of his company can only happen publicly. That is, a manager must identify himself 
as the trader should he choose to trade his shares.
With this set-up, the solution of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) can be replicated by 
endowing the manager with the standard second-best contract constructed using shares
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and cash and then after the action has been taken, the market maker can offer the agent to 
buy back the shares for the amount that would correspond to the part of the Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1990) menu offered to the agent who has taken the low-cost action. As this 
maximizes the utility of the residual claimants at the time the agent’s action has been 
taken, it seems reasonable that the market maker would be willing to do so and the same 
equilibrium with the same allocations as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) would then 
emerge in this setting. Hence, with the agent’s trades being publicly disclosed, the market 
maker can at best act as the principal in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and set prices such 
that he replicates the allocations in that model.
The Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allocations may not be the optimal strategy for 
the market maker in terms of his expected profit, but in terms of production, this is the 
best that can be achieved in this scenario -  replication of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
allocations. In other words, being able to demonstrate that the solution to the problem 
where managers are not required to identify themselves can lead to improvement relative 
to Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) is equivalent to demonstrating that insider trading can 
provide economic benefits in a setting with diffused “weak” shareholders. Thus, if the 
manager is required to identify himself, the optimal solution makes him trade on terms 
specific to him and not market prices so that the market maker can replicate the 
allocations in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Of course then there is no point to using 
tradable securities as a means of compensation in this scenario as the securities offered to 
the agent in this case are not traded at market prices.
The model that I analyze is closer to the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model than 
to the one proposed by Ma, Ching-To Albert (1994) where he look at a renegotiation
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model where the agent, rather than the principal proposes the renegotiation contract. My 
model is similar to his as in my model as well the principal does not offer to renegotiate 
with the agent due to diffused ownership, rather it is the agent that proposes the 
renegotiation in the form of trading his contract in the market. In the model by Ma, 
Ching-To Albert (1994) the agent offers the principal a menu of contracts. The principal 
will believe that the agent has taken the low-cost action if the agent offers the principal a 
full insurance contract at the renegotiation stage. Anticipating a rejection of his 
renegotiation offer, the agent chooses the high-cost action.
To deal with the multiplicity of equilibria, he imposes a belief refinement which 
states that when the principal’s initial contract and the agent’s renegotiation contract 
support the same, unique best action for the agent, then the principal must believe that the 
agent has performed this action. This restriction on the beliefs of the principal allows him 
to get back the second-best allocation as a unique equilibrium. But, unlike his model, I do 
not restrict the principal’s beliefs, and as I have established above, in my model I can 
replicate the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allocations when the agent is forced to publicly 
disclose his trades. Hence, in the rest of the chapter, I will benchmark the production 
results that I get in my model when the agent does not have to disclose with that of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
Again note that the aim of this chapter is not to characterize the optimal contract 
between the principal and the agent. Rather, I propose an alternative solution that yields a 
Pareto improvement to the problem where managers are compensated with tradable 
securities. One important point to note is that since the focus of this chapter is to find a 
potential value to the tradability feature of compensation packages I examine the scenario
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where managers are compensated with tradable securities and compare the situation 
where managers are allowed to engage in anonymous insider trading to a situation where 
managers must publicly disclose their trading activities. Hence, I do not look at the 
situation where managers are compensated with tradable securities and not allowed to 
engage in any sort of trading as this does not allow me to identify a potential economic 
reason for compensating managers with tradable securities.
5.2 Benchmark Case -  No Spread Regime
I start my formal analysis by first focusing on a hypothetical benchmark case in 
which the manager can trade anonymously at market prices, but the market maker sets 
prices without considering the presence of an adverse selection problem in the market. 
Thus the agent who is informed about his effort choice has the option to trade his shares 
(as they are tradable) at their unconditional expected value. Stated differently, while I do 
introduce information asymmetry into the market here, the market maker fails to 
recognize this and does not induce a spread in the market prices. Hence, in this 
benchmark case, prices are set such that BID= A S K . For lack of a better name, I label this 
as the “no spread” regime.
Now suppose that the agent is endowed with 8  * shares initially. Again, 8  * is 
the agent’s share-holdings in the standard full commitment contract that satisfies 
incentive compatibility given that the individual rationality constraint binds. The agent 
who has taken the high-cost action is compensated with B * cash bonus at the end of the 
game if he continues to hold 8  * shares. B*  is constructed such that the individual 
rationality constraint of this type binds so that in equilibrium he gets his reservation
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utility. Hence, this contract is the same as the risky contract that is paid to an agent who 
has taken the high-cost action in the standard full commitment model. This ensures that 
the contract given to the agent in my model is the same as the Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) contracts and hence I can rank the two models in terms of the production they 
yield.
At the time of trading effort is a sunk cost; hence, it does not enter the agent’s
future expected utility maximization problem. The expected utility, EU , of an agent who
has chosen the high-cost effort a h is given as
EU= p hU[S * H  + £*] + (1 -  p h )U[S *L  + B*].
For this type of agent to settle on a contract that is ex-ante incentive compatible (in
addition to satisfying exactly individual rationality) through his own utility maximizing
trading activities, the equilibrium market price, i t , must be such that the optimal holdings
for this agent is exactly 8 * shares. Lemma 1 establishes the necessary condition in
equilibrium for an agent who has taken the high-cost action to hold exactly 8  * shares.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition for it to be optimal for an agent who has taken a h to
continue to hold (exactly) 8  * shares in the firm is that the price it satisfies:
( H - i t )  p h _ U'[8*L + B*]
( L - i t )  1 - p h ~ U ’[ 8 * H  + B*]
Proof: Suppose the agent who chooses a*effort purchases ^additional shares, his 
expected utility with the additional yr shares is
EU= p hU[8 * H  + B * +y/{H -  it)] + (1 -  p h)U[8 *L + B* +y/(L -  it)]
His expected utility will be at the maximum when he holds exactly 8  * shares if the first- 
order condition in y/ equals zero when evaluated aty/' = 0 ,
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dEU = p hU'[S * H  + B * ] [ H - x]  + ( l - p h)U'[S*L + B*][L -  >t] = 0
y/= 0
or
dip
(H - tt) p" t/ '[£ * L  + fl*]
( L - ^ l - p "  ! / '[ £ * / /  + #*] "
U'[8 * H  + Z?*] is the marginal utility of the ah agent when x = H  is the outcome 
that is realized and is denoted for simplicity by U'[S * (H)] . Similarly U'[8 * L + B*] is 
denoted by i/'[S *(L )].
Lemma 1 provides the necessary condition for the agent who has taken the high- 
cost action to hold exactly S*  shares in equilibrium. This holds in equilibrium if the 
agent who has taken the high-cost action is at his maximum utility when he holds exactly 
8  * shares in the firm and hence has no incentive to change his claim on the firm. Lemma 
2 gives the sufficient condition for the agent who has taken the high-cost action to have 
no incentive in equilibrium to change his contract through trading in the market.
Lemma 2: A sufficient condition for this contract to characterize the case where the agent 
who has taken a h is at his maximum utility when he continues to hold exactly 8  * shares 
is for his expected utility function to be concave in 8  everywhere.
Proof: If the agent’s expected utility function is concave in £  everywhere there must 
exist a unique maximum. This holds if and only if
1. dEU/dS* > 0 at £* = 0
2. d 2E U / d 2S *< 0
See Appendix A for details of the proof. _
I have established above the necessary and sufficient conditions for the agent who 
has exerted a* to choose to hold exactly 8*  shares in equilibrium. In order for the agent
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who has taken ah to hold S*  shares, he must not have an incentive either to buy or sell 
his claim on the firm. This is achieved if the market maker chooses an appropriate price 
for the shares in the market such that there is no incentive for the agent who has exerted 
a h to buy or sell his shares. Lemma 3 summarizes the details of the price for which this 
relationship holds in equilibrium.
Lemma 3: The expected value of the firm is given by the expression 
it = &lphH  + (1 -  p h )L] + (1 -  <t )[p'H  + (1 -  p'  )L ], 
where & is the equilibrium probability of high effort.
Proof: In this regime the market price n  is formed simply by the market maker’s rational 
expectations on the final payoff which depend on the market maker’s rational 
expectations on the probability of the agent taking the high-cost action when he 
randomizes. This can be calculated as a combination of the expected market price of the 
firm when the agent exerts high effort and the expected market price of the firm when the 
agent exerts low effort weighted by the equilibrium probability of high effort (<r) and of 
low effort(1 -  <j) . Based on the market maker’s expectation of the randomization of 
effort by the agent the firm is priced at n  where
ft = a [ p hH  + (1 -  p h )L\ + (1 -  & )[p 'H  + (1 -  p '  )L ], 
where s takes the form that supports the price ;rthat satisfies the necessary condition 
established in Lemma lin equilibrium. _
For the price established in Lemma 3 to be the equilibrium price, it must be that at 
this price when the agent who has exerted ah with a probability a  is at the point where 
his utility is at the maximum. This ensures that the agent who has taken a h has no 
incentive to buy or sell shares and hence continues to hold exactly S*  shares until the
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liquidation date. This is done by substituting the value of a  that has been calculated in 
the equilibrium condition of ft (Lemma 3) into the necessary equilibrium condition that 
has been found for the high-cost agent to hold 5  * shares (Lemma 1). Proposition 1 gives 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the contract to hold in equilibrium.
Proposition 1: The necessary and sufficient condition for the second best contract with 
tradable securities to be “renegotiation proof’ is
( p ' - p V + q - p 1) Ph u'[s*(L)]
( p ' - p V - p '  1 - P h U'[S*(H)]
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. For details of the proof refer to
Appendix A. H
Proposition 1 establishes the probability of high effort a  when equilibrium prices
are set so that there is no spread in the market, that is, the market maker ignores the
adverse selection problem in the market and sets prices such that BID= ASK  = f t , and the
necessary and sufficient conditions are met so that the agent who has taken the high-cost
action holds his shares. Now I shift attention to the agent that has taken the low-cost
action. Lemma 4 provides the necessary condition to prove that in equilibrium the agent
who has taken the low-cost action is indifferent between selling his shares and keeping
them till the firm is liquidated. One point to note is that there is no short selling allowed
by the insiders here.4
Lemma 4: The necessary condition for the low-cost action agent ( a 1) to be indifferent 
between holding his shares and selling them is that B° is constructed such that the 
individual rationality constraint binds for this type.
4 This is consistent with SEC uptick ruling.
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Proof: In order for it to hold in equilibrium that the agent who randomizes between taking 
the high-cost action and not trading, and taking the low-cost action and selling his shares, 
it must be that he is indifferent between the two actions. That is, his utility from the two 
actions should be equal. This condition can be written as
p hU (S*H  + B*) + ( l -  p h)U(S*L + B * ) - C  = U ( S * x  + B°)
The incentive compatibility constraint for an agent who has taken the high-cost action is 
given by
p hU ( S * H  + £*) + (1- p h)U(S* L + B*) - C  = p lU(S *H  + £*) + ( l - p l)U(S* L + B*) 
where the LHS of the equation is the utility of the agent if he takes the high-cost action
less the differential cost of effort and the RHS is the utility of the agent if he takes the
low-cost action. Both sides of the equation assume that the agent holds his shares until
the liquidation date.
Hence it is true that the low-cost action agent is indifferent between holding his shares till 
the liquidation date and selling them. This is given by the following constraint
p lU(S * H + B*) + (1 -  p 1 )U(S *L + B*)= U(S  * it + B° ) u
One point to note is that the cash component paid to the agent B e  {B*,B°} must 
be such that B * binds the individual rationality constraint for the agent who has taken 
the high-cost action whereas B° is constructed such that the individual rationality 
constraint binds for the agent who has taken the low-cost action and sells his shares. 
Also, the condition on the cash component is such that the agent randomizes between 
taking the high-cost action and keeping his shares in the firm and taking the low-cost 
action and selling his shares, that is, the agent is indifferent between the two actions as 
his utility is the same from both choices. Hence, the cash component is constructed so
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that both types of agent are at their reservation utility. This means that the individual 
rationality constraint of both types of agent binds and hence B* > B ° . Having established 
that the agent who has taken the low-cost action is indifferent between selling his shares 
and keeping them till the liquidation date, I now demonstrate that the low-cost agent will 
always choose to sell all his shares and not just a fraction of them.
Lemma 5: If B° satisfies Lemma 4 then the low-cost agent prefers to sell all his shares to 
only selling a portion.
Proof: Assume that the agent who has taken the low-cost action sells y/ shares of the total 
number of shares (S*) that he was awarded at the beginning of the game. His utility from 
selling a portion of his shares and keeping a portion till the liquidation date can be given 
by the expression
p'U  ((<? * -ip)H  + B°)  + (1 -  p 1 )U((S * -y/)L + B°) + Uy/x
The agent in this case is compensated with B° as at the liquidation date, he does not hold 
8  * shares in the firm and hence reveals that he is not the type who has exerted the high- 
cost action.
If instead the agent who exerted the low-cost action is given the certainty equivalent of 
the shares he holds rather than the lottery he receives when holding the shares till the 
liquidation date, his utility can be expressed as 
U[({S * - y ) n ,) + <//fc + Ba]
Since the agent is risk averse his utility is higher with the certainty equivalent than with 
the lottery. This is expressed by the following inequality
p ‘U ((8 * -y /)H + B°) + ( l - p ‘)U((S*-y /)L  + B° ) + U(t//x) < 
U[((.S*-ys)nl ) + t//x + B''].
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On the other hand, if the agent who has taken the low-cost action sells all his shares, his 
expected utility is
(<?*£ + ) >  [((<5 *-V')*’,) + +  B° ]
by construction ft > 7rl , which implies that
p 'U ( ( S * -y /)H + B°)  + (1 -  p ‘ )U((S* -y/)L  + B°)  + U(yni) < U ( S * n  + B°).
By the above inequality the low-cost agent has a higher expected utility from selling all 
his shares rather than selling just a fraction of them. H
Lemma 5 provides the sufficiency condition that must hold if B° is constructed 
such that it satisfies Lemma 4 and the agent who has taken the low-cost action 
randomizes between holding his shares and selling all of them. Lemma 5 establishes that 
selling only a fraction of the shares results in inefficient risk-sharing for the agent and 
hence it shows that no interior maximum exists when the agent who has taken the low- 
cost action holds a diversified portfolio. Rather, the agent who has taken the low-cost 
action has a higher expected utility from selling all his shares.
This section overall deals with the hypothetical situation where the market maker 
does not respond to the information asymmetry in the market when setting prices. Hence 
prices in this regime are set as if there is no adverse-selection in the market. Accordingly 
the market maker does not set a spread in this market and BID= ASK  = f t . The objective 
of the market maker in this game is simply to earn zero profit in expectation and he 
supports any Pareto improvement solution. To simplify matters algebraically I assume
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that the market maker seeks to make an expected profit of zero on both the sell and the 
buy side of the market and not simply in aggregate and sets prices accordingly.5 
Lemma 6: In the “no spread” regime the market maker makes a negative profit overall. 
Proof: Lemma 2 establishes that the agent who has exerted a h is at his maximum utility; 
hence he has no incentive to change his shareholdings in the firm. On the other hand, the 
agent who has exerted a1 prefers to sell his claim on the firm and hence he liquidates his 
shares and gets full insurance. The market maker in this section sets prices such that there 
is no spread in the market, therefore, BID= ASK  = f t . Since the agent who has taken ah
does not change his portfolio and the agent who has taken a'sells his shares, insider 
trading occurs only in the sell side of the market. In this regime, prices in the buy side of 
the market are set such that ASK = ft as there is no spread in this market, As there are 
only liquidity traders in this side of the market LB [ASK -  ft\ = Oso that the market maker 
makes zero expected profit. On the sell side though, there are liquidity traders as well as 
informed traders. The market maker sets prices such that BID= f t , his profits from this 
side of the market are given by
Ls [ft -  BID] + S( l  -  a)[tt1 -  BID] < 0.
In the “no spread regime” BID= ft hence the market maker makes no profit on the 
liquidity traders but looses money when he trades with informed traders as itx < f t . 
Hence, overall, the market maker’s profits in this regime are negative. ^
5 This restriction actually makes the production gains smaller, but as I am concerned about demonstrating a 
gain and not about the specific magnitude of this gain, the simplification this brings justifies this 
assumption.
70
As the market maker makes a negative profit in this regime it is hard to imagine 
that he would participate in such a regime. However, this regime only serves as a 
hypothetical benchmark and is not suggestive of a complete equilibrium.
5.2.1. Comparison of No Spread Regime with FT (1990)
In the above section I established that when the market-maker does not induce a 
bid-ask spread in the market and there are “weak principals” that do not offer to 
renegotiate with the agent, in equilibrium the agent will exert ^ 'w ith  a 
probability a  when the equilibrium price of the firm is set at ;rby the market maker. The 
randomization probability derived in the above artificial benchmark case can now be 
compared to the probability of high effort in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where a 
“strong principal” offers the agent a renegotiation-proof contract that induces the agent to 
randomize and exert the high effort with a probability cr*7 (rewritten in my notation):
1 - a ”  * ' ( H ) - 4 X L ) ( p k( l - p h) '
f ( U )  {  p h - p ‘ ) '
where <j>' here as in FT (1990) denotes the derivative of the inverse of the agent’s utility
function. For notational simplicity <f>\U(S(//))) is denoted by </>\H) and similarly
(U(S(L))) by <f>'(L) . Another way to think about the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990)
model as I have explained in Section 5.1 is a scenario where the agent is compensated
with tradable securities and allowed only to engage in public trading. Intuitively, the “no
spread” regime should do worse than Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) as in this model the
agent has the option to anonymously trade away the risk potential of his contract rather
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than revealing his trades publicly. This acts as an additional constraint to the Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1990) maximization program as in equilibrium the contract in their model is 
constructed such that the “strong principal” offers the agent a renegotiation-proof 
contract where the agent has no incentive to trade. Mathematically, this is true -  
comparing the probability of high effort in the “no-spread” regime with that of Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1990) shows that under all parameter values except those identified below, 
the probability of high effort in the “no-spread” regime is always lower than that derived 
in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Proposition 2 below provides the specifics of the 
parameter value for when the production in the “no-spread” regime equals that in 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
Proposition 2: Production in the “no spread” regime is equivalent to that in the Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1990) model (only) when
1. *'<ID = tV)
2. p ' = 0
Proof: To rank the two models, I consider the scenario where the Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) model has the biggest disadvantage, that is, which gives the lowest er*7 . As 
is a weighted average between (f>\H) and (f>'(L) this is equivalent to 
setting fi'ilT) = <j>\L) which is just an imposition on the particular form of risk-aversion of 
the agent, intuitively it says that the agent’s risk preferences change only for large 
amounts. Substituting = </>'{L) yields
(l-<TFr)(ph - p l) _ f ' (H )  1
* Frp h( l - p h) 4XD
P h —Q'FTP h — P l + (TF7p / | 1
a Frp h{ \ - p h) 4XL)
Suppose now that p l -  0. This means that it is unlikely for the realized terminal value to 
be high ( x  = H ) given that the agent has taken the low-cost action. This is a more 
extreme assumption, but it is instructive as it ensures that I get equivalence between the 
two models.
p \ \ - c j FT)
a ^ p W - p b )  f ( L )
l  — CF*7
<7^(1 - p h) 4XD
l — erFT + a FT(1 — p h) _  (t>\H)
0-^(1 - p h) ~ <f>(L)
1 - o - 'V
(j^a-pb) <t>xv>
Looking at the equivalent expression in my model for where the agent who has taken the 
high-cost action has no incentive to trade in the market with “no spread,” the probability 
of high effort a  must satisfy
<J(P1 - P b ) - P l
p _  U \L )  
U X H )1 - p h J
Similarly, now suppose p l = 0 . 1  then have
- 6 p b p b + p h _ U X D  
- S p b ( l - p b ) ~  U X H )
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p h( l - o p h) _ U \L )  
oph( l - p h) U \ H )
1 - 6 p h U \ L )
a(\-Ph)~u'(H)
The expressions for cr'7 and <j are equivalent because the derivative of the inverse of 
the utility function {(/>') equals the inverse of the derivative of the utility function (U '). ^
With qV{U__) = (/>\L) and p l -  0 ,1  have the case where I get equivalence between
the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model and the “no spread” model, that is, cr/T = a . As 
expected, however, the model in this chapter is always dominated by the Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1990) model and at best I can only achieve equivalence between the two models 
under extreme circumstances. Intuitively, allowing the agent the possibility to trade his 
compensation under “weak principals” that cannot offer to renegotiate with the agent due 
to diffused ownership lowers the agent’s incentives to exert high effort. Only in the 
special case where the agent’s utility function has the shape where the slope of U (L) and 
U (t/) are the same and the probability of getting the high outcome given that the agent 
has exerted the low-cost action is close to zero, can I achieve equivalence between the 
two models. Hence, production is generally lower in my model where there are “weak 
principals” that offer the agent compensation in tradable securities and the agent has the 
opportunity to alter his compensation package by engaging in anonymous insider trading.
5.3 Market with Spread
As the market maker in the previous section makes a negative profit when he 
ignores the information asymmetry and sets prices such that BID= ASK = n , he will not
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participate in that regime. In this section then, I allow the market maker to respond to the 
asymmetry of information introduced by the possibility of insider trading by setting 
prices such that there is a spread in the market, i.e. ASK > B ID . The objective of the 
market maker in this game is simply to earn zero profit in expectation. The market maker 
sets prices in such a manner that as long as he earns (at best) zero expected profit he 
supports any Pareto improvement solution. As discussed in the previous section, I rely on 
the simplifying assumption that the market maker seeks to make an expected profit of 
zero on both the sells and the buys and not simply in aggregate. Since it is assumed that 
each informed trader trades only once and the prices are pre-set, they do not care how 
their trade affects the future price path.
The unconditional expected value of the firm that is supported when the agent in 
equilibrium exerts high effort with a probability a  * is
a* = cr*ah + ( l - a * ) f t i ,
I identify the equilibrium prices that exist in the market when the market maker responds 
to the adverse selection in the market by imposing a spread such that ASK > BID so as to 
make a zero profit on both sides of the market and support a Pareto improvement 
outcome.
As discussed earlier, in the second-best contract with full commitment the agent 
exerts the high-cost effort with probability one, whereas in the Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) model as the agent randomizes between high and low effort, he performs the high- 
cost action with a probability less than one. The central theme of this chapter is to try to 
get the randomizing probability of high effort as close to “one” as possible and hence get 
as close to the production generated in the full commitment model without changing the
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contract that the agent is endowed with. Hence, even though multiple equilibria could 
exist in this regime with adverse selection, the particular one that I am interested in is the 
one that supports the highest probability of high effort ( cr *).
Another point to note is that the market maker can impose a different set of prices 
to obtain a spread in the market, but I choose to focus on the one below as it generates a 
Pareto improvement and allows the market maker to earn zero profits in expectation. The 
focus of this paper is not to characterize the optimal contract, rather with the particular 
spread imposed by the market maker I can rank my model of anonymous insider trading 
with a model with public trading and demonstrate that under some parameter values 
allowing the agent to engage in insider trading yields a Pareto improvement
Lemma 7 establishes the price in the sell side of the market that supports the 
highest probability of high effort while Lemma 8 provides the price in the ask-side of the 
market so that the market maker makes zero profit on the buy side.
Lemma 7: To sustain ah in equilibrium with the highest probability possible, it must be 
that the market maker sets BID = i t .
Proof: To get cr * as high as possible the market maker sets the bid price to be as high as 
possible without creating an incentive for the agent taking ah to sell his shares while an 
agent taking a1 should have an incentive to sell all his shares. This is the case if BID = i t . 
If BID > it both, an agent taking ah and a1 ,will profit from selling and hence the game 
would have a unique equilibrium where the principal will only be able to induce a 1. _
Lemma 8: The ask price ASK = 7t * set by the market maker is such that the market 
maker earns zero expected profit on the buy side of the market.
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Proof: The market maker’s expected profit is required to be zero for either type of insider 
trading. With ASK > ft only insider selling occurs in the market, that is, there is no 
informed buying. The expected profit for the market maker from liquidity buyers who 
buy at the ask price is LB[ASK -/r* ] = 0 which in turn requires that the market maker 
chooses the ask price so that ASK = 7r* . ^
The above two lemmas establish the equilibrium prices set by the market maker in 
both the sell and buy side of the market. I have derived the equilibrium prices such that 
the market maker at best makes zero profit. Proposition 3 establishes that the equilibrium 
conditions needed so that the market maker in expectation makes zero profit on both sells 
and buys leads to the result that cr* > <r .
Proposition 3: When the market maker imposes a spread in the market, such that 
ASK > BID and prices are set so that BID = ft and ASK = 7t *, higher production is 
achieved than when the market maker imposes no spread. Also in this regime the market 
maker makes zero expected profit on both the sell and the buy side of the market.
Proof: In Lemma 8 above, I established that the market maker makes zero profit in the 
buy side of the market with adverse selection by setting ASK — 7r* . To demonstrate that 
the market maker also makes zero profit on the sell side of the market, I need to analyze 
the expected profit of the market maker from selling to liquidity traders and to inside 
traders who sell because the bid price is above the expected value of the stock at the end 
of the game. The expected profit is given by the expression 
Ls \n  * -BID] + S( 1 -  o*)\nL -  BID] .
In Lemma 5 , 1 established that with no spread imposed in the market, the market maker 
makes a negative profit when BID= ASK -  f t . In order for the market maker to make a
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zero profit on the sell side of the market, it must be that;r* > f t . Given that in equilibrium 
the expected value of n  * is given by n* = cr * n h + (1 -  cr*)7r, and ft = 5 n h + (1 -  G)nl , 
for n* > f t , it must be that cr* > & .
Since \n L -  BID] is negative and \nH -7rL] is positive cr*is positive.6 _
Proposition 3 shows that in equilibrium cr* > 0 and that cr* > a  under all 
conditions, socr* is closer to the standard full commitment second-best contract with 
moral hazard than &. As cr* > , if the market maker makes zero profit on both the sell
and the buy side by imposing a spread in the market, the economy as a whole is better off 
as production increases.
The intuition behind the production efficiency gain result is that the agent who 
has exerted high effort has no incentive to trade in the market as long as ASK > ft and 
BID = f t . On the other hand, the agent who has taken the low-cost action has an 
incentive to sell his shares at prevailing prices. Hence, the market maker knows that 
insider trading occurs only on the sell side of the market. Due to the fact that there is only 
inside selling, the market maker can set the ask price at the true conditional value of the 
firm. By imposing a large enough spread, the market maker can insure himself of the 
losses he will incur by buying from insiders. In order for the market maker to make zero 
profit on the sell price of the firm, the expected value of the firm n  * must be higher than 
that in the “no spread” regime. As a result of having to sustain the increased expected 
unconditional value n *  the incentives for taking the high-cost action are increased.
6 a  can approach 0 in the extreme when p h -> 0, whereas cr* > 0 as 8  > 0, 
and[;rL -  BID] < 0 .
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Hence, in equilibrium, the agent takes the high-cost action with a greater probability 
which results in an increase in production.
Another insight of this chapter is that the more noise traders that trade in a firm’s 
shares, the tighter the bid-ask spread of the firm, which then reduces the disciplining 
force of the market maker against the agent taking the low-cost action. Hence, the results 
suggest that the more liquid a firm is the more potentially detrimental insider trading 
might be for that firm as the disciplining force of the market maker is lowered in these 
types of firms. Hence, regulation that prohibits insider trading could potentially adversely 
affect companies that are more liquid if employees are compensated with tradable 
securities.
It is true here that when the low-cost agent sells his shares the liquidity traders 
loose money on their trades. This is not an issue that is unique to this model, but is 
common to the literature. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) in their paper also have a model
n
where the “liquidity traders lose money when they must sell their shares.” But as I have 
demonstrated, allowing for insider trading under certain parameter values leads to a 
Pareto improvement due to the increased production and hence these gains can be 
reallocated by a redistribution method such as taxation, fees, etc. As the focus of this 
chapter is not on allocation issues, I do not explicitly design a redistribution mechanism, 
but as there is an increase in production with no adverse risk sharing, this efficiency gain 
can be redistributed to the liquidity traders (provided they are risk neutral) so that in 
equilibrium they are not worse off.
7 p. 680.
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5.3.2 Comparison of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Spread Regime
As I have already established that in the model where there are “weak principals” 
and the agent anonymously trades his compensation on the market and the market-maker 
responds to this information asymmetry by imposing a bid-ask spread the probability of 
high effort is higher than the probability of high effort in a market with no bid-ask spread. 
That is, cr*>&. Also, in the limiting case analyzed in Section 5.2.1, a  77 = a .  By 
continuity then cr*> cr77 in cases where p l is relatively close to zero and when is
sufficiently close to</>'(L) . In conclusion, for low enough value of p l , it is better to rely 
on the market version of my model where there are “weak principals” and the agent 
anonymously trades his compensation on the market but the market maker imposes a 
spread in market prices. In this case, allowing the agent to engage in insider trading 
results in an increase in production that leads to a Pareto improvement where the 
economy as a whole is better off rather than allowing agents to engage only in public 
trading. Hence this chapter hints at a potential economic gain that derives from the 
tradability feature of the compensation package and can help explain the popularity of 
tradable securities being used as compensation vehicles.
Theoretically there is no way of assessing how large the region is where my 
model dominates that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) or as I have explained public 
trading. However, such parameter values do exist and hence it is unclear that regulation 
requiring managers to publicly disclose their insider trades always benefits the economy. 
If the region is potentially large then giving managers the right to engage in private 
anonymous trading could lead to a Pareto improvement.
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6. Conclusion and Implications
The debate on insider trading has mainly focused on what constitutes appropriate 
regulation from a public policy standpoint. It is an issue that cannot be resolved easily as 
insider trading generates both positive and negative externalities, and hence the 
magnitude of these externalities must be known before a conclusion can be reached. This 
chapter attempts to contribute to this disclosure debate from a theoretical standpoint by 
looking at the positive externalities of compensating managers with tradable securities as 
they open the door for insider trading and allow employees to renegotiate their contract 
through trading in the market.
In this chapter, I do not attempt to evaluate the social consequences of insider 
trading instead, I show that by adding an additional source of information asymmetry 
through the mechanism of insider trading to a simple problem of renegotiation with moral 
hazard, under certain situations there are production efficiency gains without adverse risk 
sharing implications. Hence, under certain parameter values there are strict gains to 
anonymous private trading when there are atomistic shareholders for the owners of the 
firm to compensate managers with tradable securities compared to imposing regulation 
that always requires managers to publicly disclose their insider trades.
The model presented in this chapter has some direct implications for regulation on 
the disclosure of executive shareholdings and trading activities. The chapter shows that 
when there are “weak principals” who do not own or control a sufficiently large fraction 
of the firm to be able to renegotiate with the agent, and there exists adverse selection in 
the market, under certain conditions anonymity of trading leads to production efficiency 
gains and to an overall increase of wealth in the economy. Hence, I would argue that in
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these situations, welfare could be increased if regulation did not require companies to 
fully disclose executive shareholdings and trading activities as giving managers the 
freedom to change the risk potential of their contract through engaging in insider trading 
leads to greater production. If regulators in these situations imposed public disclosure of 
this private information it would potentially lead to lower production.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2: 1. To prove dEU/dS* > 0 at S* = 0
EU= p hU[ S *H - ( S* - i j / ) x  + B*] + ( l - p h) U [ S * L - ( 8 * - y ) f t  + B *
dEU/dS* = p ' V [ S *H - ( S - y/)k + B*][H - k] + (1 -  p h) U ' [ S * L - ( 5 - y / ) k  + B*][L- k] 
dEU/dS*evaluated at 8* = 0 equals
p kU'[y/k + B*][H -  k] + (1 -  p" )U\y/k + B*][L -  k]
= U'[y/k + B*][ph[ H - k ]  + ( \ - p h)[L-k]]
By assumption U' > 0
Need to prove p h (H -  k ) + (1 -  p h )(L -  k)  to be positive.
At a  = 0 this expression equals
p kl H - p ' H - a - p ' ) L ]  + ( l - p h) l L - p ’H - Q - p ' ) L ]
= p ‘ ( l - p ' ) ( t f - L )  + ( l -p * )p '(L - f f )
By assumption H > L which implies H - L >  0 and L - H  < 0
Also, p h (1 -  p 1) > (1 -  p h ) p l as we know p h > p 1, hence the expression is positive.
2. To prove that d 2E U / d 25* < 0
EU= p hU[S*H -  (S-y/)7t  + £*] + (1 -  p h)U[S*L-{S-y / )7t  + #*] 
d 2E U / d 2S* =
p hU \ S  * H -  {8 - y / ) x  + B*][H -  ft]2 + (1 -  p h)U \ S * L - ( S -  y/)ft + B*][L -  ft]2 By 
concavity of U we know that U ” < 0 
Clearly, [H -  ft]2 and [L -  ft]2 are positive.
Hence, d 2E U / d 2S*< 0. H
Proof of Proposition 1: a  can be calculated by substituting the expression for n  into the 
first-order condition derived earlier i.e.
cH - f t ) p h _ U'[8*L + B*]
(L - f t ) 1 - p h ~ U'[8*H + B*]
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Accordingly, if in equilibrium, effort randomization occurs according to<j, an agent 
taking ah does not have an incentive to change his (risky) holdings of shares in the firm 
and hence at this price no trading occurs by this type of agent.
Performing the substitution now yields
H - [ a [ p hH + ( l - p h)L\ + ( l - &) [ p lH + ( l - p l)L]] p h _  U\S*{L)]
L -  [<j[phH + (1 -  p h )L] + (1 -  &)[plH  + (1 - p l )L]] 1 - p h U'[S * (//)]
H - 6 p hH - S L  + SphL - p lH + SplH - L  + 6 L + p lL - o p lL p h U'[S*(L)]
L - 6 p hH - 6 L  + oLph -  p lH + 6plH - L  + 6L+ p lL - 6 p lL 1 -  p h ~ U'[S*(H)]
Rearranging the terms, the ratios equal
H(l  — 6ph+ op1 — p 1) — L{—6ph + \ — p l + op1) p h _ U'[S*(L)]
H ( - 6 p h + 6 p l - p l ) - L ( - 6 p h- p 1- 6 p l) 1 - p h ~ U'[S*(H)]
( H - L X l - q p "  + S p ' - p ‘) p h U \ S * ( m
( H - L ) ( . 6 p ' - S p " - p ' )  1 - p h U'[S*(H)]
g(p '-f>*) + ( l - p ' )  p" U'IS*(L)] 
a ( p ' - p h) - p '  1 - p "  U' [S*(H)] ‘ ■
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Chapter 4: The Economic Consequences of Private
Information Acquisition in a Model where Employees are 
Compensated with Tradable Securities
Abstract: Tradable securities continue to be a popular compensation vehicle, yet there is 
tremendous regulatory discussion on the need to prevent employees from being able to 
gain from trading such securities by using their private information. This paper attempts 
to analytically capture the SEC notion of insider trading where a manager has material 
non-public information prior to trading his equity claims. To model this issue of interest I 
use a principal-agent framework where the concept of insider trading is captured by 
contract renegotiation. I identify three information structures and compare the production 
in the economy to a scenario where private information acquisition is prohibited. 
Contrary to general intuition, I show that situations may arise where private information 
collection and insider trading by employees results in higher production in the economy 
and can be socially desirable compared to a situation where the agent is only allowed to 
engage in public trading. I demonstrate that as long as the information collected by the 
agent has an impact on the expected liquidation value, the principal would prefer that the 
agent collects this private information as it leads to an increase in the production of the 
firm.
1. Introduction
In this chapter I build a theory about the impact of private information acquisition 
by employees on insider trading in a model where such employees are compensated with 
tradable securities. I assume that if employees could trade their compensation packages, 
they would take the opportunity and hence I examine the economic consequences on 
production of allowing employees to collect private information relevant to their trades. 
To analyze this problem, I use a principal-agent framework and rely on the notion of 
renegotiation to explore the concept of insider trading. I identify three information
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structures that have differential impacts on the agent’s effort exertion and production in 
the total economy. These information structures have different properties and can be 
related to accounting information in their characteristics. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on renegotiation with private information, insider trading and compensation 
design.
Although the potential for insider trading appears to be of significant concern to 
investors and regulators alike, it is an empirical fact that executives receive large 
fractions of their compensation in the form of tradable securities. Any contract based on 
tradable securities can in principle always be replicated with non-tradable securities that 
would give the employer tighter control on the incentives and trading activities of the 
employee. Indeed, it seems paradoxical to compensate employees with tradable securities 
only to impose restrictions that prohibit them from taking advantage of the tradability 
feature of their compensation packages.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintains that “the detection 
and prosecution of insider trading violations” is “one of its enforcement priorities.” Rule 
10(b) 5-1 of the SEC defines insider trading as when a “person trades on the basis of
o
material nonpublic information that he is aware of when making the purchase or sale.” 
According to the definition provided by the SEC it is important that the trader acquires 
private information prior to making his trading decision in order for the trade to fit the 
SEC’s notion of insider trading. The model I develop captures the SEC’s notion of 
insider trading by allowing the agent to collect private information that is relevant to the 
liquidation value of the firm prior to determining his trading strategy.
8 Emphasis is added by the SEC, for more details look at http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm
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The private information that I explore here is a private signal that gives the agent 
a better estimation of the liquidation value of the firm which he collects prior to trading a 
portion of his compensation on the market. Some examples of private information that 
the model captures are information that managers may acquire on competitors, on the 
success rate of future projects, on pending patents, and/or on future mergers and 
acquisitions. It is realistic to assume that since the manager has closer contact with the 
firm on a day-to-day basis, he can acquire private information that allows him to have a 
more accurate estimation of the liquidation value of the firm than the market.
I do realize that the type of information I attempt to capture in this model is hard 
to prevent the agent from acquiring since it is information that comes from the usual 
running of the firm. It is not likely for the agent to avoid having real private information; 
however, I demonstrate that for certain information structures having the agent gather 
such private information generates a Pareto improvement compared to a situation where 
the agent is only allowed to publicly trade. What is crucial for the results to hold in this 
model is that the information is private and has not yet been impounded into the market 
price of the firm; hence allowing the manager to extract the potential gains from trading 
on his private information acquisition.
In this chapter I attempt to model the situation that is more descriptive of publicly 
traded companies, that is, that of diffused ownership, where the firm is owned by several 
atomistic shareholders who are residual claimants of the firm. As each “principal” only 
owns a claim to the residual value of the firm, it is natural to assume that each “principal” 
does not own or control a sufficiently large fraction of the firm himself to be able to offer 
to renegotiate with the agent. I term this situation of diffused ownership as having “weak
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principals.” Hence in the model that I present the only option for the agent to 
“renegotiate” the contract that he is originally offered is to trade his compensation with 
the market. That is, the agent can reduce his risk-exposure only by selling at prevailing 
(equilibrium) market prices some or all of the tradable securities with which he was 
initially endowed.
To analyze the problem of private information collection in a model with tradable 
securities I use a principal-agent framework and rely on previous research on 
renegotiation to model insider trading. In particular, I utilize a model closely related to 
that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where they allow the principal to renegotiate with 
the agent and show that due to renegotiation the principal cannot induce high effort as a 
pure non-degenerate strategy. I also use Chapter 3 as a benchmark where possible since 
the results derived in that model show the impact on effort and production when an 
employee is compensated with tradable securities and can engage in insider trading but 
does not have access to any additional private information apart from his effort choice. 
The main result of that chapter shows that by allowing the agent to trade the securities in 
his compensation on the market results in the agent taking the high-cost action with a 
higher probability than in a scenario where he is not permitted to engage in insider 
trading and hence generates a Pareto improvement. This chapter extends the model in 
Chapter 3 in a manner consistent with the SEC notion of insider trading by allowing the 
agent to acquire additional private information that is correlated with the liquidation 
value. This extension enables me to highlight the desirable properties of private 
information to add to the disclosure regulation debate.
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To ascertain the potential impact of private information collection by the agent, I 
identify three possible information structures that capture different properties of 
accounting information. Intuitively, one might expect that if the manager can acquire a 
private signal relevant to the liquidation value of the firm, he would engage in more 
aggressive insider trading which would then result in the manager trading with a higher 
probability and subsequently lower production than if he was restricted from gathering 
such private information. In the first information structure I identify, information 
acquisition by the agent has no impact on his trading behavior. The information collected 
by the agent in this structure has no impact on valuation, but can be used for internal 
reporting. The properties of the second information structure are such that private 
information acquisition has an impact only on the expected liquidation value of the firm 
and serves as a complete substitute for effort randomization and hence the agent exerts 
high effort with probability one. In the third information structure, the agent trades on 
both his action choice and private signal. The trading in this case is also beneficial as 
information collection acts as a partial substitute for effort randomization and hence 
generates a Pareto improvement compared to the situation where the agent can only 
engage in public trading. I also explore the results in the case where it is costly for the 
agent to gather private information.
This chapter adds further theoretical insight to the empirical phenomena of 
employees being compensated with tradable securities. More formally, this chapter helps 
in understanding the impact of private information acquisition by the agent in a 
renegotiation setting. It follows the spirit of other papers that highlight the tradeoffs of 
mandatory disclosure by showing that restricting the gathering of private information by
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managers who are compensated with tradable securities may result in losses in the overall 
economy by lowering production. It also highlights that insider trading based on certain 
types of information might be beneficial. This chapter provides theoretical support to the 
empirical phenomena of using tradable securities as compensation vehicles by showing 
the benefits that accrue to the principal through increased production. Hence, it adds 
nuance to the debate on regulation and advises regulators to be cautious when completely 
prohibiting insider trading as it may have unintended negative economic consequences.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives a 
brief literature review and Section 3 I explain the results of Chapter 3 which serves as a 
benchmark for this chapter and the main differences between that chapter and this one. 
Section 4 gives the model set-up that follows through in the three information structures 
that are identified in Section 5. In Section 6 ,1 relate the information structures to types of 
accounting information. Section 7 investigates the case where information collection is 
costly and Section 8 concludes the chapter and discusses some implications for 
accounting regulation.
2. Literature Review
In a closely related paper, Gigler and Hemmer (2004) examine different 
properties of information in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation. They 
analyze when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing 
shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a 
reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that managers 
choose to disclose. In full commitment models transparency is always desirable as
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making the agent’s private information public leads to more efficient contracting. In their 
paper they show that in a renegotiation setting commitment not to produce information 
can be valuable. The commitment not to produce information in their model serves as a 
substitute for the assumed inability to commit not to use the information in the 
renegotiation stage.
Renegotiation in their model gives less scope for transparency of the agent’s 
private information to have value. The very existence of the agent’s information is 
necessary to prevent renegotiation from leading to a complete collapse of the incentives 
for the agent to take productive actions. It is not always the case that less transparency 
results in more efficient renegotiation-proof contracting. Rather, the optimal channel for 
disclosure depends on how much information about the agent’s actions the signal 
conveys. They depart from Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) by introducing the additional 
assumption that the act of exerting effort produces information about future consequences 
of those efforts beyond knowledge of simply how much effort was supplied. In this 
model actions produce a separate contemporaneous signal about future outcome. As a 
result of introducing this leaming-by-doing, renegotiation-proof contracts will be able to 
sustain a non-zero amount of effort without inducing the agent to randomize over effort 
choices.
In this chapter, I look at when it is advantageous for the shareholders to allow the 
manager to collect private information that is correlated with the liquidation value of the 
firm in an agency model that allows contract renegotiation. I examine different 
information systems and their impact on effort and production to determine under which 
situations shareholders would allow private information acquisition. However, the focus
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of my chapter is different from theirs in that I primarily examine the consequences of 
compensating employees with tradable securities where it is natural to assume that 
employees can trade their compensation with the market.
This chapter is also closely related to the paper by Dye (1984). Since I have 
already outlined the model and main results of the Dye (1984) paper earlier, in this 
section I will highlight the connections between my model where the agent is permitted 
to collect private information prior to trading and his paper. This information acquisition 
combined with the agent being able to engage in anonymous insider trading generates a 
Pareto improvement through an increase in production compared to a situation where the 
agent is prohibited from collecting private information but compensated with tradable 
securities and allowed to engage in anonymous trading. The Dye (1984) model differs 
from this chapter in a significant manner. In his model the agent trades reveal his private 
information, while in this model it is essential that the private information of the agent is 
not revealed through his trading for him to be able to gain from his private information.
In this model it is crucial that when the agent engages in insider trading it is anonymous 
to obtain the Pareto improvement through an increase in production.
The next section provides the rationale for Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) as a 
benchmark for examining the case for public trading. I then explain in detail the model 
set-up for Chapter 3 which serves as a benchmark for this chapter as that model examines 
the impact on effort and production without private information acquisition by the agent 
in a situation where the employee is compensated with tradable securities and permitted 
to “renegotiate” his compensation by engaging in anonymous trading with the market.
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3.Background Set-up
3.2 Model with No Private Information Collection
In Chapter 3 I turn towards the renegotiation literature as a framework for 
understanding the effect of an employee changing his contract through insider trading. In 
the model in this chapter, the principal is uninformed not just about the agent’s action 
choice, but also the private information he has collected and his trading strategy. Chapter 
3 however sets up a model to analyze the impact on production when employees are 
compensated with tradable securities and allowed to engage in anonymous insider trading 
with no private information acquisition on the agent’s part. A key contribution of that 
chapter that I adopt in this model is the analytic construction of insider trading. In the 
remainder of the chapter, I attempt to benchmark the production that I get in my model 
against the production generated in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model and the one 
generated in the REM9. Again, the focus of this model is not to characterize the optimal 
arrangement between the principal and the agent but to suggest a Pareto improvement 
solution beyond that achieved in the REM model.
The main result of Chapter 3 is that for certain parameter values allowing the 
employee to anonymously trade based on the private information he has, that is, his effort 
choice, yields higher production than situations where only public trading is permitted. 
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that to respond to the information 
asymmetry in the market caused by the agent trading on his private information, the 
market maker imposes a spread that reduces the profit the agent can make trading on his 
private information. In that situation, the market maker acts as a disciplining force and
9 REM signifies randomization of effort model (Chapter 3) and IAM signifies information acquisition 
model (Chapter 4).
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sets prices in such a manner that the agent is forced to take the high-cost action with a 
higher probability than if insider trading was prohibited. Hence, the incentive for the 
agent to take the low-cost action is reduced. This leads to an increase in production and 
hence a Pareto improvement is obtained. The probability of the agent taking the high cost 
action when the market-maker does not impose a spread in that model is denoted as 
<j, .10 When the market-maker imposes a bid-ask spread in the market, the spread serves 
as a disciplining force and the probability of the agent taking the high-cost action 
increases to o \ .  I will refer to the Chapter 3 model throughout this chapter as the 
randomization of effort model or REM for short.
The agent in the REM trades his compensation based only on the action choice he 
has made. The REM model is set-up so that the trading strategy and action choice of the 
agent have a one-to-one correspondence such that if the agent has taken the high-cost 
action in equilibrium he holds on to his shares until the liquidation date. On the other 
hand if he has taken the low-cost action his equilibrium trading strategy is to sell his 
shares and receive full insurance. The agent’s trading choice in the REM model is such 
that it is a sequentially rational response to the action choice he has already made. 
However, the action choice and trading points in the time-line could be interchanged 
without affecting the results. In other words, the results would be unchanged if the agent 
traded first and then took the equilibrium action choice that was a best response to his 
trading strategy. A strength of the REM model is that the structure is fluid, but at the 
same time it could be argued that this fluidity between the trading and action choice 
strategies may not be completely consistent with the way the SEC defines insider trading
10 A subscript of 1 indicates variables from Chapter 3 (REM model) and subscripts of 2 indicate variables 
in this chapter (IAM model).
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as discussed in the introduction of this chapter as it is not necessary in the REM that the 
agent has any material nonpublic information (i.e. has chosen a particular action) before 
engaging in insider trading.
In this chapter I attempt to capture the notion of insider trading in a manner that is 
perhaps more consistent with the definition of the SEC as discussed in the introduction. 
In this chapter the model is constructed such that the agent secures private information 
prior to his trading. Here, the private information that the agent secures affects his 
subsequent trading strategy, hence in this model, it is important that the agent secures 
private information before trading. In this model then, the trading and action choice 
strategies of the agent cannot be interchanged, here trading occurs sequentially after the 
action choice. I will refer to this model throughout this chapter as the information 
acquisition model or IAM for short. Hence in the IAM model, the agent relies on two 
pieces of private information -  his private signal and his effort choice -  prior to engaging 
in insider trading while in the REM the agent only relied on one piece of private 
information -  his effort choice.
In this model, the agent collects a private signal that alters his beliefs on the 
estimation value of the firm in addition to his effort choice. As the agent collects private 
information that then influences his trading strategy, this model seems more consistent 
with the SEC definition of insider trading as the agent has “material nonpublic 
information” before engaging in insider trading. In the IAM similar to the REM, the only 
opportunity the agent has to change the contract that he was initially endowed with is to 
trade the shares in his original compensation on the market.
4. Timeline and Structure of the Model
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The sequence of events in this model can be summarized by the following time­
line.
t = 0 
The Principal 
and the Agent 
agree to a 
contract
t = l 
Agent chooses 
e\ where 
i e  {l,h}
t = 2 
Agent observes 
0j where
j  ^ { g M
t = 3 
Agent
“renegotiates” 
his contract by 
trading his 
claim on the 
firm in the 
market
t = 4 
Terminal value 
of the
firm x2 where 
i e  {l,h} is 
observed, the 
agent’s portfolio 
holdings are 
observed, he is 
compensated and 
the firm is 
liquidated
At t = 0 the principal and agent agree on an incentive contract (S2, B2) where S2 is the 
number of shares awarded to him that entitles him to a fraction S2 of the liquidation 
value of the firm and B e  [B*2,B l } is the cash component that the agent receives. With 
only two potential levels of output, this assumption of differential cash bonuses is without 
loss of generality. At t = 1 the agent chooses an unobservable action e'2 where i e  {l,h} 
that effects the liquidation value of the firm as well as the agent’s private signal 
<9. wherey e{g ,b}-
At t = 2 the agent observes a private signal 9} where j  e  {g ,b} . The signal is not
the true value of the firm but is correlated with the liquidation value of the firm x\ where 
i e  {/,/&} and thus gives the agent a better estimate of the terminal value of the firm and
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hence can potentially alter the agent’s trading behavior. The agent only privately 
observes 0. but does not observe the true liquidation value x'2 of the firm. The 
probability structure between the agent’s private information and the liquidation value is 
given by the parameter y\ where i e  {l,h} and j  e {g ,b}. The effect of the agent’s action
e\ where i e  {l,h} on earnings can be given by the following probability structure:
g
Xe 8
1
0
Prob(Qg \e'2)
ri
At t = 3 the agent “renegotiates” his contract by trading y/ shares in the market at 
the market clearing price. His trading strategy is potentially affected by both his action 
choice and his private signal unlike the REM model where he only relied on his action 
choice to determine his trading strategy. Similar to the REM model, it is also true here 
that the liquidity traders are “ripped o ff’ when trading with the insider. In the IAM I 
show that by allowing the agent to collect private information relevant to his trading 
decision leads to a Pareto improvement due to increased production. The gains in 
production can be reallocated by a redistribution method such as taxation, fees, etc. to the
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liquidity traders. As the focus of this chapter is not on allocation issues, I do not explicitly 
design a redistribution mechanism, but as there is an increase in production with no 
adverse risk sharing, this efficiency gain can be redistributed to the liquidity traders 
(provided they are risk neutral) so that in equilibrium they are not worse off.
Finally, at t = 4 the terminal value of the firm x l2 where i e  {l,h} is observed by 
the principal. Also at this time, the manager’s portfolio holdings are observed and the 
principal pays him his cash bonus accordingly. In equilibrium the terminal cash payment 
from the principal to the agent is B2 for an agent who holds S*2 shares in the firm and an 
agent who holds no shares in the firm receives B2. This assumption is similar to the one 
in Chapter 3 and is consistent with the reasoning that the market in the firm’s shares 
closes before compensation is paid to the agent, which is consistent with insider trading 
reporting requirements specified in section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, and hence the trading of the manager are revealed to the principal. It is similar to 
the assumption made in the paper by Dye (1984). Similar to the REM model, this 
assumption is without loss of generality as it does not affect the agent’s effort and trading 
choices and is made only so that in equilibrium the agent receives his reservation utility.
This practice of conditioning the agent’s bonus not just to firm performance but 
also to the agent’s portfolio holdings is common in practice. For example, in a New York 
Times article, the author Leslie Wayne discusses that one way that Campbell Soup 
Company has responded to shareholder activism is by tying the executives’ compensation 
to the company’s performance and requiring that top officials have a certain portion of
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their net worth tied in Campbell stock.11 This is one example of many companies that pay 
bonus compensation conditional on their employees’ portfolio holdings. Hence, having
B* * B° in the model is one way of capturing anecdotal evidence through the analytical 
structure. Finally, the firm is liquidated.
In this chapter I make the assumption that the agent is not permitted to short sell, 
which means that S*2 is required to be non-negative. This assumption is consistent with 
the SEC’s uptick rule which maintains that insiders are prohibited from short-selling their 
claim on the firm. I also make the assumption throughout Section 5 that the agent can 
initially collect perfect information costlessly. I will later on discuss the implications of 
introducing cost into the information acquisition function.
5. Analysis
5.1 Information Acquisition is Trade Neutral
It is immediately clear that it is possible to have a scenario where the agent can 
acquire a private signal but, it has no impact on his trading strategy compared to a 
scenario where he does not collect private information, which is the REM. This is true 
when the information collected by the agent does not have an impact on the estimation 
value of the firm and hence does not alter his trading behavior compared to the REM. To 
formally verify this, assume that the agent can costlessly acquire a private signal Q'j, 
where i e {l,h}and j  e {g ,b } , that does not change the agent’s beliefs about the terminal 
value of the firm. Formally, y'g =1 - y lb this means that the probability of x2 being
11 Taken from the article Campbell Revises Executives’ Rules, by Leslie Wayne published in New York 
Times on Tuesday October 12, 1993.
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realized conditional on observing the good signal 0 or the bad signal 0h is equal. Hence,
the only information relevant to the agent’s trade is his effort choice. This case is 
interesting because even though it does not change the probability of effort randomization 
by the agent compared to that in the REM, the private information acquired by the agent 
could be useful to the principal.
In standard communication games, when the agent has perfect private 
information, the principal generally benefits (weakly) from this information acquisition 
by appealing to the revelation principle. In renegotiation games, the benefits of perfect 
private information acquisition are not always so clear-cut. It may not always be possible 
with renegotiation to exploit the revelation principle as binding the truth telling constraint 
might be too costly for the principal. Therefore the principal may not be able to extract 
rents from the agent’s private information in such models.
As the information acquisition in this case does not change the agent’s trading 
strategy from the REM, the probability of the agent exerting the high-cost action in this 
scenario is the same as the REM which is equal to crI. In the REM model the only private 
information the agent has prior to trading is his effort choice. In this case, as the 
information collection does not impact the agent’s trading behavior or the production in 
the overall economy compared to the REM there is no consequence for the agent to 
acquire this information. However, there exist information structures for which private 
information collection by the agent can impact production in the economy. I identify two 
particular information structures -  one, where information acquisition by the agent acts as 
a complete substitute for effort randomization and the other, where it acts as a partial 
substitute. In both cases the economy as a whole benefits from the increased production
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from the agent collecting private information. These information structures are discussed 
below in turn.
5.2 Information Acquisition Is a Complete Substitute for Effort Randomization
In the REM model with the possibility of renegotiation due to insider trading, the 
agent randomizes his effort with a probability equal tocr* when the market maker 
imposes a spread in the market. In this section, I show that it is possible to substitute the 
randomization of effort result with an information system that yields the same probability 
of trading but has the agent taking the high-cost action with a probability equal to one. In 
this section, the agent engages in insider trading with the same probability as the REM. 
The only difference being that trading here is set up conditional on the agent’s private 
signal and in equilibrium the agent is incentivized to take the high-cost action with 
probability one. Hence, in this scenario, the standard second best effort and production 
are achieved. In the REM the agent randomizes between the high-cost and the low-cost 
action with probability < 1 and hence, production is less than second best. The 
information structure that I identify in this section of IAM model achieves a Pareto 
improvement compared to the REM model as production is increased without changing 
the contract awarded to the agent.
Suppose that the expected value of the shares conditional on 0. is the same
regardless of whether the agent has exerted eh2 or el2. This means that r\ =rl8 =rg 
and y hb = y lb = yb. Hence, the agent holds his shares till the liquidation date if he has seen 
0g and sells if he has seen 9b. The agent then in this information structure trades based
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only on one signal -  the private signal he receives and effort is irrelevant in determining 
his trading strategy. Hence in this information structure, the predictive ability of 0. does
not depend on the agent’s effort choice.
Assume further that I denote the Prob(0g \e2) = cr*2. What follows is that the
agent in this scenario trades his shares in equilibrium with probability l - c r 2 as he trades 
only when he observes^ . In the REM, the agent in equilibrium takes the high-cost 
action with probability errand hence trades his shares with probability 1 - cr*x . By 
denoting the Prob{0g \e2) = cr2 in the IAM, the agent trades with the same probability in
the IAM as in the REM, that isl-cr,* = l-cr*2, but as I will show there is no effort 
randomization in the IAM resulting in production in the IAM being higher than the REM.
The diagram below represents the information structure in this scenario. The 
agent receives a private signal 0} that is correlated with the true outcome of the firm
through the conditional probability/' , where i e { l , h }and j  e {g ,b) .  This structure can 
be denoted by the following diagram
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8i - r
i
7  b
To guarantee equivalence between the two models, however, I also need to set the 
value of the output x2 in the IAM equal to the value of output in the REM, so that the 
underlying production parameters in both settings are the same and hence, when I 
compare the two settings I am holding constant the production problem. That is, in order 
to compare the production between the IAM and the REM, the production process should 
be the same in both models. To achieve this I set the output in both models as equal.
Given my assumptions on the information structure, when the agent takes e2 the 
expected liquidation value in the IAM can be given by the following equation.
a 2 (;ygH  + (1 - y g )L) + (1 -  cr2* )((1 - y b)H + ybL)
Going back to the REM, the expected liquidation value when the agent takes the high- 
cost action can be given by the following expression.
p i H + a - p i ) L
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To ensure that the production problem as well as the contract given to the agent is the 
same in the REM as in the IAM I set the two expressions for the expected liquidation 
value as an equality.
* 2 (;Yg H  + (1 -  y g )L) + (1 -  cr2* )((1 - y b)H + yb L ) = p \H  + (1 -  p \ )L
a \ y gH  +  a \ L -  cr*2y gL + H  -  cr*2H  - y bH  + a \ y bH  + y bL -  <j\ybL  =  p \ H  -  p \ L  +  L 
a 2y g[H - L ] - a 2[H - L \ - y b[H - L] + a \ y b[H - L] = p[l[H - L\ + l [H - L]
Dividing through by H -  L gives
a\r t ~o\ - y b + c r2V» = p\ + 1
Which can be rearranged to yield 
_• _ P \  + -1=  7 (A)
Yg +Yb “ I
Similarly, the same system of equations can be solved for when the agent takes the low- 
cost action e2, where I denote the Prob {Qg \e2) = a 2.
f f 2 = (B)
rs + n - 1
Hence, if the parameter values are such that the two conditions (A) and (B) hold for 
y  and yb, then the agent has exactly the same level of private information in the IAM as
in the REM. Since by assumption, y h = y lg = y  , yb = y lb = y b and p * > p \ , it follows
from (A) and (B) that cr2 > <x2.
Another way of equating the agent’s private information in the IAM and REM 
models is to focus on just the probabilities of the expected liquidation values in both the 
models. Hence, I can rewrite the probability of the expected liquidation value in the REM 
in terms of the conditional probabilities in the IAM. Since the production in both models
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is the same, that is xx = x2 I can denote the expectation of the liquidation value of 
x  = H x in the REM by the conditional probabilities of the expected liquidation value 
x  — H 2 in the IAM as pf = o’*2y g + ( l - c r 2)(1 - y b) • Similarly, the expected liquidation 
value of x = L, in the REM can be denoted by the conditional probabilities for x = L2 in 
the IAM as p\ = a 2y g + (1 -  o 2 )(1 - y b).
It is clear that under the conditions above, the underlying production problem is 
the same under this information structure in both the IAM and the REM. Lemma 1 
establishes the necessary condition for the agent who has taken the high-cost action and 
seen 6g in the IAM not to have an incentive to trade his contract with the market through
the mechanism of (unobservable) insider trading. Once the necessary condition is 
established, I then characterize equilibrium prices in this setting. Following that, I show 
that in equilibrium the renegotiation proof contract for the agent who has taken the high- 
cost action is such that he trades with a probability (1 -  cr*) ,  that is, equal to the 
probability with which the he observes 0b.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition for it to be optimal for an agent who has taken e2 not to 
have an incentive to trade when he has seen 0 is that the price n 2 satisfies the condition
{H-7t2) r g  ^ u '[S*2l + b;]
(.L - 7 t 2) \ - y g ~ U'[S*2H  + B *2]
Proof: Suppose the agent who has chosen e\ effort and seen 0  trades, his expected utility 
can be given by
EU = y gU[S*2H  + B\ + y/(H - n 2)] + ( 1 - y g )U[S*2L + B\ + y/(L -  tu2)]
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In the above equation for the expected utility (EU), y/ takes on a positive value if the 
agent purchases additional shares on the market and correspondingly the value of y/ is 
negative if the agent sells shares from the initial contract that the principal has given him. 
One point to note is that the agent is prohibited from engaging in short selling, which 
means that S *2 is required to be non-negative.
For the lemma to hold, it must be that the agent’s expected utility is at a 
maximum when he does not trade his shares in the market, that is y/ -  0 . Formally, this 
can be expressed by the first-order condition in y/ being greater than or equal to zero 
when evaluated at y/ = 0 . 
dEU = y gU'[S'2H  + B*2][H - 7r2] + ( l - y g ) U \ 8 *2L + B*2][L - n 2]>0
t/=0dy/
Rearranging yields
cH - 7 t 2) r g ^  U f[S2 L + B 2]
(l - £ 2) i - r g U ’IS‘2H  + B'2] ■
Lemma 1 establishes the necessary condition for the agent who has taken the 
high-cost action and seen 0g not to have an incentive to trade. The above (weak)
inequality would have to hold exactly as an equality if the market maker would set only 
one price in equilibrium. The necessary condition can also be satisfied with two prices 
(setting a spread), as long as they are set such that the low price (bid-price) is set such 
that the condition is satisfied as “=” and the high price (ask-price) is set such that the 
condition is satisfied as “ > ” inequality. Due to the spread set by the market maker, the 
condition above ensures that the agent will hold exactly S 2 shares in equilibrium. Lemma 
2 defines the equilibrium price.
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Lemma 2: Suppose the agent has taken e2  in equilibrium and ft1 satisfies the necessary 
condition in Lemma 1, then n 2 can be given by the following expression 
n 2  = a 2 [ygH  + (1 -  y g )L\ + (1 -  ^ ) [ (1  - / b)H + ybL]
Proof: The expected value of the firm is given by the market maker’s rational expectation 
of the value of the firm given that in equilibrium the agent exerts e2 and observes 6 g with
a probability cr*. H
As discussed above, the market maker can satisfy the necessary condition in 
Lemma 1 either by imposing one price or a spread in the market. If the market maker 
imposes a spread, then the bid price is set at;r2 which ensures that the agent who has
taken e2 and observed 0  does not have an incentive to sell his shares in equilibrium
(Lemma 1). In addition, if the ask price is set strictly greater than the bid then the agent 
does not have an incentive to buy additional shares in the market. This is because the ask 
price is such that it is set above the expected value of the firm. Hence, in equilibrium the 
agent has no incentive to change the contract portfolio that he was initially endowed with. 
Proposition 1 makes formal that trade in this particular information structure depends 
only on the agent’s private information and not on his effort choice.
Proposition 1: Trade by the agent in this regime depends only on the agent’s private 
signal 0 t wherei e {g,6}.
Proof: Refer to the Appendix B for the proof. _
Having analyzed the agent’s actions when he has taken e2 and o b serves^ ,
below I establish the necessary condition for the agent who has taken e2 and observes 0b 
to strictly prefer selling his shares to holding them. For this to be true it must be that B2,
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that is, the agent’s cash bonus given that he sells the S *2 that were given to him by the 
principal in his original contract, is constructed such that the individual rationality 
constraint binds for this type.
In order for it to hold in equilibrium that the agent who has taken e\ strictly 
prefers selling his shares to holding them if he has observed 6 b it must be that his utility
from selling is greater than or equal to his utility from holding on to his shares. This can 
be formally denoted by
(1 - yb)U(S*2H  + B*2) + yb)U(S'2L + B \ ) < U{8 \tc2 + B °2 ) (C)
The LHS of equation (C) is the expected utility of the agent when he holds on to his 
shares, and the RHS is the agent’s expected utility when he sells his shares. By 
construction jz2 is a linear combination of the expected value of the firm when the agent 
has taken the high-cost action and seen the good signal and the expected value of the firm 
when the agent has taken the high-cost action and seen the poor signal. As the expected 
value of the firm is higher when the agent has taken the high cost action than the low-cost 
action, the LHS < RHS of equation (C).
The sufficient condition above also ensures that if the agent has observed 0b he
prefers selling all his shares rather than a fraction of his shares. The price at which the 
agent sells his shares is formed by the market maker’s rational expectation of the value of 
the firm when the agent has taken the high-cost action. This expected price will be higher 
than the expected value of the firm when the agent has observed the bad signal, hence the 
agent will prefer selling all his shares and receiving full insurance rather than just a 
fraction of them when he has taken observed the bad signal as he is assumed to be risk- 
averse.
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Proposition 1 establishes that trading under this information system depends only 
on the agent’s private signal and not on his effort choice in such a manner that in 
equilibrium the agent takes the high-cost action and holds on to his shares if he has seen 
the good signal and sells otherwise. Lemma 3 shows that the contract that the agent 
receives in equilibrium under the information structure identified in the IAM is equal to 
the contract that the agent receives in equilibrium in the REM, that is, the agent’s utility 
under both models is the same, which then allows me to focus the comparison on the 
production in the two models.
, UXS^L + B*,] _ U'[S’2L + B *2]Lemma 3:
UXS*H + Z?*] U \ 8 \ H  + B*\
Proof: In the REM model the individual rationality constraint can be given by
a ' t lp iU(5’H  + B ’) + (1 -  p ’; )U (8 ’L + B,') -  C] + (1 -  er,')[p[[/(£,'//+ B ' ) + (1 -  p[)U (S ’L + B,‘) > f. 
and the incentive compatibility constraint can be given by
p ';u (S[h  + b [ ) + ( \ -  p '; )u (s ;l + b I ) - c  = p [u {8[h  + b [ ) + a  -  p [ )U(51l + b I)
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint in the individual rationality constraint 
gives
p f U t f H  + Bj) + (1 -  p ! ) U ( S ‘L + B ’) - C  = U
In the IAM model, the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraints of 
the agent are the same as the REM, hence it must be true that S*x =  S *2 and B[ = B2. 
Hence it must also be true that
U'[S;L + Bl] _  U'[S*L + B*2]
U \ S [ H  +  f l ‘ ] ~  U ’IS'2H  + B'2] ■
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In this section, I have proved that if the information structure is set up in a 
particular way such that private information acquisition by the agent in the IAM is a 
complete substitute for the effort randomization generated in the REM and second best 
production is achieved. Intuitively, trading on the signal swamps the effort component 
and hence the agent only relies on his private signal to determine his trading strategy. The 
important point to note is that even though production in the IAM model is greater than 
the REM model, the private information that the agent acquires and therefore the 
probability of him renegotiating his contract with the market through insider trading is 
the same in both the IAM and REM as a \  = g \ . But, as the principal is able to generate 
higher production in the IAM than in the REM while giving the agent the same contract, 
the principal would prefer when compensating the agent with tradable securities that the 
agent acquires and trades on his private information relevant to the liquidation value than 
prohibiting the collection of private information if the information structure is set-up as 
under the information structure identified above.
5.3 Information Acquisition Is a Partial Substitute for Effort Randomization
In the previous section I identified an information structure where private 
information acquisition by the agent acts as a complete substitute for effort 
randomization. In the case identified, the private information that the agent collects 
allows the information asymmetry in the model to be the same as the REM and hence the 
agent trades with the same probability as in the REM with no effort randomization. The 
information structure is such that the agent only trades on his private signal and not based 
on his effort choice. Hence, the principal gets back second best production while
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permitting the agent to collect private information in a regime where anonymous insider 
trading is permitted. In that case, the principal is better off allowing the agent to collect 
private information as production increases.
In this section, I identify an information structure where the agent relies on both -  
his private signal and his effort choice to base his trading behavior. In this case, the 
private information that the agent collects acts as a partial substitute for the effort 
randomization result of the REM. Hence in this case as well, the agent takes the high-cost 
action with a greater probability than in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model resulting 
in an increase in production when the agent in allowed to gather private information in a 
model where anonymous insider trading is permitted compared to a model where the 
agent is only allowed to fully disclose his trading activities. This section provides support 
to the argument that in general when employees are compensated with tradable securities 
allowing them to collect private information that is relevant to their trading behavior is 
potentially socially desirable due to the increase in production.
The agent in the IAM has two sources of private information -  his action choice 
and a private signal. Hence, here there are four possible action-state combinations that the 
agent could have -  { , 0  }, { e \ , 6 b }, {e \ , 6 g } and {e l2 , 0 b } where e\ refers to his
private information about the action choice he has made and Qj refers to the private
signal about the liquidation value that the agent receives. Importantly, there is a 
possibility that when the agent takes the high-cost action he could still get the low signal 
and similarly when he takes the low-cost action he could receive the high signal. Also, in 
this case it is not so clear-cut under which conditions the agent would choose to continue 
to hold on to his claim on the firm and under which conditions he would choose to
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liquidate his claim and sell his shares. For example in contrast to the REM, the agent in 
this case could decide to hold on to his shares when he has taken the low-cost action and 
observed the good signal.
To identify the potential adverse implication of this added complexity, suppose 
that an equilibrium exists such that the probability of the expected liquidation value for 
the two action-state combinations {e2 , 6 b } and {e[ , 0 } are equal. That is, the
probability of the high expected value being realized is the same for the two action-state 
combinations. The probability of realizing the high value given the action choice of the 
agent and the private signal he has observed can hence be ordered as follows:
(High) Prob (H I e2, 6 g) > (Medium) Prob (H \ e2 ,0b) = (Medium) Prob (H  I e2, 0g) >
(Low) Prob (H I e[ , 0b), which in terms of the notation of the model is equivalent to
(6g Ie i ) r kt > V , \ e i m - r l ) =  (0g \e'2) r ‘ > V g Ie'2M - r l ) .
Suppose that the agent always holds his shares in the high action-state 
combination and always sells his shares in the low action-state combination, however, the 
agent’s trading strategy is not so clear-cut in the medium action-state combinations.
There are two possible equilibria for the medium action-state combinations -  the agent 
can either choose to hold on to his shares or he can choose to sell his shares in those 
action-state combinations. I first consider the equilibrium where the agent holds on to his 
shares in the medium action-state combinations {e2 , 0 b } and { e [ , 6 g } and in the high
action-state combination {e2 , 6 g } and sells only in the low action-state combination
[el2, 6 b}. Lemma 4 gives the necessary condition for the agent who is either in the
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medium and high action-state combination not to have an incentive to change his original 
contract by trading in the market.
Lemma 4: The necessary conditions that must be satisfied for it to be optimal for an agent 
who is in either medium action-state combination {e2, 0 b } or {el2, 0 g } to have no
incentive to “renegotiate” his contract through trading his shares on the market is given 
by
H - f t 2- v .  h\  v <(s;l + b ’)
j
i - r i
n
£ v  / AH - 7 t 2
L - x ,
r*
1 - r i
„ for action-sate combination { e7‘ , 0 , }, and 
U'(S2H + B2) ' 2 ‘
,  . .  . , , . . for action-state combination { e2, 0 g }.
U'(S*H + B *2)2 A  /  8 /
Proof: As the two action-state combinations have the same probability of the high 
expected value being realized, I need to establish the necessary condition for the agent 
not to trade in each of the action-state combinations. This is true if the original contract 
given by the principal is such that the agent is at his maximum utility with this contract 
and hence does not have an incentive to change his contract. The expected utility of the 
agent who purchases \// additional shares and has taken the high-cost action and observed
the poor signal, that is, is in action-state combination {e2 , 0 b }, can be given by the
following expression.
EU  = (1 -  r hb )U(S2H + B *2 + y/{H -  ft2)) + y hbU{S*2L + B\  + y/(L- k 2))
In order for it to be that the agent is at a local maximum with his original contract and 
hence does not want to trade with the market, the first-order condition of the agent’s 
expected utility with respect to y/ at y/ = 0 should be 0.
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dEU
dy/
= (1 -  r l  ) u x s ; h  + B\ )(H -  ft2 ) + r hbu  \ s 2l + b \  ) ( l  -  ) = o
=^0
Rearranging yields
( H - f t
L - i t
2 y n*
U ' & L  + B 2 ) (D)
£/'(£2# +  ^ 2)
Similarly, the expected utility of the agent who purchases y/ additional shares and has 
taken the low-cost action and observed the good signal, that is, is in action-state 
combination { e l2 , 0  }, can be given by the following expression
EU = y ‘t U(S;H + B[ + y/{H -  i 2)) + (1 -  y[ )U(S[L + B[ + i//(L -  ))
Similarly, the first-order condition for his no-trade behavior to be a local maximum can 
be given by the first-order condition 
dEU
y/=0dy/
Rearranging yields
= y l. U \ 8 \ H  + B\)(H - 7t2) + { \ - y [ ) U \ 8 \L  + B \ ) ( L - t t 2) = 0
/  ~ \ 
H - f t 2 f  I \  
Ys
k L-7T 2 j 1 — y l V r s J
U \ 8 '2L + B2) 
U\S*2H + B2)
(E)
Since the two action-state combinations have the same probability of the high value 
output being realized, the agent’s utility ex-ante must be the same in both action-state
combinations. This means that since
(  i \
r g
r l  J 1 — y l  ^ r S J is true by assumption, the
contracts or the RHS of equations (D) and (E) must be equal.
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I have now established the necessary conditions (D) and (E) that must hold in equilibrium 
for the agent to hold his shares in the medium action-state combinations {e2 , 6 b } and
m
Lemma 5 establishes that if the agent chooses to hold his shares in the medium 
action-state combinations, then it is true that he will also hold his shares in the high 
action-state combination.
Lemma 5: If the agent holds the shares given to him in his original contract in the 
medium action-state combinations, then he must necessarily hold the shares given to him 
in his original contract in the high-action state combination.
Proof: Consider the condition that must be satisfied for it to be optimal for the agent to 
hold his shares in the high action-state combination {e 2 , 0 g }, that is, when he has
exerted the high-cost action and privately observed the good signal. The expected utility 
of this type of agent when he purchases y/ additional shares is given by
EU = y hgU(S*H + B 2  + y/{H -  k 2)) + (1 -  y hg )U(8 *L + B\  + y/{L-  k 2))
Similarly, the first-order condition that establishes his no-trade behavior can be given by 
dEU = y ngU \ d 2H + B2)(H - 7t 2) + ( l - y g ) U \ S 2L + B 2 ) ( L - x 2)>  0
y/=0dy/
Rearranging yields the necessary condition for this type of agent not to have an incentive
y yAs yl  > y'a it must be true that — 8—  > — . Hence the condition above is satisfied
g g i - r l  i - y \
when Lemma 4 is satisfied. _
Lemma 4 and 5 establish the necessary conditions for the agent types who are in 
either the high or medium action-state combinations not to have an incentive to 
“renegotiate” their contract by trading their shares in the market. Lemma 6 determines the 
equilibrium price that is consistent with Lemma 4 and 5.
Lemma 6: The equilibrium price can be given by the following expression
k1 = ^ [ [ P r o b ( 9 g I eh2) [ / , H + (1 -  y'1 )L] + (1 -  Prob(6r lc'*))[(l-  y hb)H + y hbL\\ +
a-o~)l[ProbOt \e[)}ly‘gH + ( \ - y[)L\+ (1 -Prob(0t Ie '2))[(1 -y'b)H + y'bV&
Proof: The equilibrium market price is formed by the market maker’s rational 
expectations of the final payoff. This in turn depends on the market maker’s rational 
expectations of the probability of the agent taking the high cost action (cr*2*) when he 
randomizes between the effort choices. The equilibrium price can be calculated as a 
weighted average of the expected price when the agent takes the high-cost action and the 
expected price when the agent takes the low-cost action. The expected price when the 
agent takes the high-cost action is weighted by the probability of him observing the good 
signal and the bad signal. Similarly the expected price when the agent takes the low-cost
action is weighted by the probability of his private signal outcomes. As the price ft2 is
based on the market maker’s expectation of the randomization of effort by the agent,
** ^<t2 in equilibrium takes the form that supports the price n 2  that satisfies the necessary
condition established in Lemma 4. ■
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At this price it is clear that the agent has no incentive to purchase additional 
shares, hence the bid-price can be set such that BID = ft2 as it is the lower price in the 
spread. Also, to ensure that the agent does not have an incentive to purchase additional 
shares, the market maker can set the ask price higher than or equal to the bid-price, that
is, ASK > ft2. By imposing such a spread in the market, the market maker can ensure that 
Lemma 4 and 5 hold in equilibrium, that is, agent types that are in the medium and high 
action-state combinations do not have an incentive to “renegotiate” their contract in the 
market.
Assume the special case where Prob (6 g I e2) = Prob (0g I el2) = a . This allows me
to ensure that the contract given in both medium action-state combinations to the agent is 
the same and hence his utility from being in either action-state combination is the same, it 
also makes the problem more tractable. The above equilibrium price can be re-written as
k  = 0 -2" [[ a [ / hgH  + (1 -  r \  )L] + (1 -  a)[(l -  y hb )H  + y hbL]] +
(1 -  )[[ a[y‘sH  + (1 - y [  )L] + (1 -  a ) [ ( l-y'„)H + y ‘bL ]]
The condition in Proposition 2 defines the equilibrium randomization probability 
cr2 with the particular information structure identified in this section. This then allows 
me to compare in Proposition 3 the maximum probability of the agent taking the high- 
cost action to that obtained in the REM which serves as a benchmark for no private 
information acquisition.
Proposition 2: The necessary and sufficient condition for the contract with tradable 
securities and private information acquisition by the agent to be renegotiation proof is
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Proof: Substituting the value of n 2 in the necessary condition from Lemma 4
v “  " 2 y v  S
yields the expression in the proposition
U \S*H  + B *2)
I have established the necessary conditions such that the agent in the { e2 , 6 g },
{ e2 , 6 b } and { e l2 , 0 g } action-state combinations do not have an incentive to
“renegotiate” their contract with the market by engaging in insider trading. As I have 
turned to Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) as it is an appropriate benchmark to examine the 
scenario where the agent is required to fully disclose his trading activities, in proposition 
3 ,1 compare the maximum probability of the agent taking the high-cost action in the IAM 
model under this information structure (cr2 ) with the maximum probability of the agent 
taking the high-cost action in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model (cjj). For an 
understanding of how to modify the notation of Fudenberg and Tirole to my model where 
the agent is permitted to engage in anonymous insider trading but is prohibited from 
acquiring private information (Jaffer 2007), please refer to the Appendix B.
Proposition 3: The probability of the agent exerting high effort in the IAM with this 
information structure is higher than that in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model 
(public trading), that is, cr2 > o x.
Proof: By construction (1 -  y h) + y hb =1 and ( l - y lg) + y lg =1 and from equation (F)
V n  /  y  ’ s y
, it must be that y lg = (1 -  y l )
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I now equate the probabilities from the REM with the probability construction that 
includes private information acquisition in the IAM
Pi = ay* + (1 -  a)(l -  y hb ) and p[ = ay's + (1 -  a)(l -  y ‘b)
Pi - p'l = a(r * -  r ')  -  (1 -  aXn‘ -  rl)
Substituting the probabilities from the REM model into the necessary condition yields
U ’(S*L + B*)( *** ( _ / \ _i_ /i „ /\Y  i «,h\\ P \  P \  ) (I P \  ) I Y b
**/ h I x I
( P i  P i  ) P i Yl U \ S 2H + B*2)
As p f = a y h + ( l - a ) ( l ~ r l )
<x-r i )  = p \  ar§ and r l  = \ - Pl aTs1 - a 1 - a
Re-written yb =
1 -  or
Ai - r l  _ ________________
rl i - p ! - a ( i - r l )
i - r l PiComparing — —  and — —  first by numerator and then by denominator 
r l  i - p *Pi
p i  -  a r \  < p \  and 1 -  p \  -  a{\ -  r \ ) > 1 -  p \  as long as p \  > r \  •
1 - r hAs the numerator of the equation — p~is smaller and the denominator is larger,
Y b
i - y! .  p I<
Y b
~ r ~ T  when 
l ~ P i
As the contracts are the same the RHS is the same, I can now compare <j *2* with &x.
( r i - P i V i + q - P i f) p \  _  u'[s*(L)]
( P li - P hi ) 6 i - P li 1 - P hi U ' [ S * ( H )]
(REM)
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r ° 2*{ phx - p [ )  + { \ - p [ ) H i - r hb ]  = u'(S*2l  + b *2) 
,  <?7 ( p : - p I ) - p I  A  rl  J u\s*2h  + b ; )
d **
To do this I need to sign the derivative — — ^~T\ '
1~Yb
. r l
(IAM)
I obtain this derivative by taking the implicit derivative of the function
** / / x h h
2  \P\ Pi ) Pi A  Yb J U ’(S2H + B2)
'j-  with respect to r l z i L )  
r l  ,
which is a
constant. I refer to V (p ,* -p , ' )+ ( i -p ,* )Y  
I < ( p I - p D - p I K  r l  J
as “ Cl ” in the remainder of the
proposition.
For cr2 > da . < o
d
Yb
da.
dCl
d a 7
' i - r l '
r l
dQ
- r l '
rl
1 ** ** S h l\ /d a 2 ~cr2 (Pi ~ P i ) ~ P i
dCl
(p ! - p !)
r nh  ^Pi
1 n *1l ~ p  i
(pf-p.'xa-p,') Pi
i -p *
i - p , ‘
- o -2 ( p , - p , ' ) - p ;
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d<7 2
rl
(-<7*‘ (p* -  p [) + 1 -  p[ (pf - p i ) -  p[
( - i r ? ( p ? - p ! ) - p : x p ? - p ! )
Algebraically then, the sign of
1 „ /l
P i  
da r
p,* A
i-p.'
_** / A / \
^2 \ P \  P i  )
Pj )  
i - p t )
r , is negative and hence I conclude that
1~ Y b
rl
a 2 > a ]. I
To summarize, I have identified a case where the properties of the information 
structure are such that the agent collects private information that leads to the high-cost 
action being taken with a higher probability than in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
model which is a benchmark for examining production in a setting where the agent is 
only permitted to engage in public trading. Production increases relative to the 
benchmark where private information acquisition is not allowed and the agent can only 
engage in public trading and this has socially desirable implications for the overall 
economy. The intuition behind this result is that information asymmetry generated from 
gathering private information acts as a substitute for the information asymmetry that is 
generated by effort randomization. Hence, the more the agent can rely on the private 
information to determine his trading behavior the less he randomizes on his effort 
choices. The information structure identified above helps support the general notion that 
allowing the agent to collect private information in a scenario where the agent is 
compensated with tradable securities increases the agent’s effort and positively impacts 
production in the economy. This is a bit surprising as one would have conjectured that 
allowing the agent to collect private information relevant to his trading choice while at
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the same time allowing him to also engage in insider trading would result in the agent 
taking the high-cost action less often. However, as the results show, allowing the agent to 
collect private information results in a Pareto improvement as the agent takes the high- 
cost action more often than if he were not allowed to collect private information and only 
engage in public trading.
6. Properties of Accounting Systems that Relate to the Above Identified Information 
Structures
The first information structure identified was one where private information does 
not have an impact on the agent’s trading behavior as it does not change the agent’s 
estimation of the expected liquidation value of the firm. This private information has no 
impact on valuation and to the extent that financial reports are used as a means for 
valuation, the information is not relevant to investors. However, the information can 
potentially be beneficial to the principal as it can be used for internal reporting.
The second information system is orthogonal to that identified first. In this case 
the private information gathered acts as a perfect substitute for effort randomization. This 
occurs exactly because the information system is price relevant and hence would alter 
both the agent and principal’s assessment of firm value. The information produced by a 
system impacts the estimation of the firm value and could be of potential interest to an 
external audience such as third-party investors of the firm if used for valuation purposes.
Lastly, for the third information structure identified, the properties of the 
information obtained by the agent are such that the agent takes the high-cost action with a 
higher probability and production in the overall economy is increased compared to a
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scenario where the agent is required to publicly disclose his trading activities. The 
characteristics of such an information system are that it generates information that is 
relevant about the expected liquidation value and about the agent’s action choice. As the 
agent uses both his action choice and his private information to base his trading behavior, 
the information collected acts as a partial substitute for the effort randomization and 
hence has positive consequences. Hence, the information gathered under this structure 
can be useful both for internal purposes as well as by parties external to the firm such as 
outside investors and analysts.
7. Information Acquisition is Costly
The analysis in the previous section relied on the assumption that information was 
acquired at no cost to the agent. In this section I investigate the results in the event that 
private information is costly to acquire. It is immediately clear that if the agent bears a 
cost in collecting the information the best case analyzed above (the second information 
structure) cannot be implemented. Hence, the agent will not exert high effort with a 
probability one. Rather the agent will randomize between the effort levels as in the REM. 
If on the other hand, the principal incurs the cost of the agent gathering the private 
information, the results differ; the results of second best production as in the second 
information structure identified can still be implemented. This section analyzes the case 
where the principal bears some of the cost of gathering the private information. One point 
to note is that the cost of collecting the information cannot be too high otherwise it will 
be too costly for the principal to satisfy the agent’s participation constraint, and hence the 
principal will want to deter private information collection by the agent.
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The agent similar to the costless case has private information about his action 
choice and the private signal. As described in the case where information collection is a 
partial substitute for effort randomization (Section 5.3), there are four possible action- 
state combinations that the agent could have -  {e \ , 0  }, {e2 , 6 b }, {e l2 , 0  } and
{ e [ , 6 b }where e\refers to his private information about the action choice he has made
and 0 . refers to the private signal about the liquidation value that the agent receives.
Similar to the case where information is a partial substitute, suppose that an equilibrium 
exists such that the probability of the expected liquidation value for the two action-state 
combinations { e2 , 0b } and { el2, 0g } are equal. In other words, the probability of the high
expected value being realized is the same for the two action-state combinations. The 
probability of realizing the high value given the action choice of the agent and the private 
signal he has observed can hence be ordered as follows:
(High) Prob (H \e 2 ,0g)>  (Medium) Prob {H I e2, 0b) = (Medium) Prob (H I e l2, 6 g) >
(Low) Prob (H I el2, 6 b), which in terms of the notation of the model is equivalent to
(0 g Ieh2 ) r hg > (0 g \eh2 m - r hb)= (6 g \e l2 ) r lg > (0 g \e'2 w - r lb).
Below, I examine the equilibrium where the agent holds on to his shares only in 
the high action-sate combination and sells his shares and receives full insurance in the 
medium and low action-state combinations.
Lemma 7: The necessary condition for it to be optimal for an agent to continue to hold on 
to his shares only in the high action-state combination {e 2 , 0 g }, that is, when he has 
exerted the high-cost action and privately observed the good signal can be given by
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rH - m 2C> r h )1  g
\ L - x 2  J i - v h V /  g J
U'{S*2L + B'2)
U'(S2H + B2)
Proof: The expected utility of this type of agent when he purchases y/ additional shares is 
given by
EU = y gU(S2H  + B 2  + y/(H -  a 2 )) + (1 - / ' )U(S’2L + B[ + y/(L- n 2 ))
Similarly, the first-order condition that establishes his no-trade behavior can be given by 
dEU
dy/
= y hgU'(S"2H  + B; )(H -  n c2  ) + (1 -  y \ )U'(S[L + B\ )(L -  n c2 ) = 0
i//=0
Rearranging yields the necessary condition for this type of agent not to have an incentive 
to trade
H - n \
L - 7T. i - r
U'(S*L + B*2)
U ’(S2H  + B *2) ■
Under this scenario, the equilibrium price as given by the market maker’s rational 
expectations on the agent’s probability of taking the high-cost action is summarized in 
Lemma 8.
Lemma 8: The equilibrium price can be given by the following expression
n l  = a L2 UProb(0! I e2  )ly''H + (1 -  y" )L] + (1 -  Prob (6 g I e\ ))[(1 -  y*h )H + y",L]\ +
(1 -  a 2c )[[ Prob dr I e '2 )] [y'g H  + (1 -  y[ )L] + (1 -  Prob (fig I e[ ))[(1 -  y ' )H + y ‘bL]]
Proof: The equilibrium market price is formed by the market maker’s rational 
expectations of the final payoff. This in turn depends on the market maker’s rational 
expectations of the probability of the agent taking the high cost action (cr2 ) when he 
randomizes between the effort choices. ■
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Again, let us examine the special case where Prob (6g I e \ ) = Prob (0 I e l2) = a .
This allows me to equate the contract given to the agent in both medium action-state 
combinations and hence their utility from being in either action-state combination is the 
same. The above equilibrium price can be re-written as 
Tt'i = o f[[  a[/*H + (l-y>)L] + ( l -a )[ ( l -r t )H  + riLl] +
(1 -  o f )[[ air' H + (i ■- r[ m +(1 -  «)[(i - r l ) n  + r ‘M
The condition in Proposition 4 defines the randomization probability <rf with the 
particular information structure identified in this section.
Proposition 4: The necessary and sufficient condition for the contract with tradable 
securities and costly private information acquisition by the agent to be renegotiation 
proof is
- g f [ a r ( /*  - y lg) - ( \ - a ) { y l  - y lb) \ - a y lg + { \ - a ) y lb + a  
-  o f  [ a ( r hg -  r ' )  -  (1 ■- a X r l  a y ' + (1 -  a)y[  - ( l - « )
Proof: Substituting the value of ;zf in the necessary condition from Lemma 7
y
Yi U'(S*L+B*) 
U\S*H + B*).h
h - Z i M  r hs 1 u \ s ’2l +b ' 2) . .  . . . = -------- 7------- V” yields the expression in the proposition.
KL - n t J i  - r , ‘ U \ S 2H  + B2)
Following the case where information collection is a partial substitute, to compare 
the probability of the agent taking the high-cost action with costly information collection 
to that in the REM, I need to take the implicit derivative. Proposition 5 gives the results 
of this comparison.
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Proposition 5: The probability of the agent exerting high effort under costly information 
collection with this information structure is higher than that in the Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1990) public trading model, that is, cr2c > <Tj .
Proof: I first equate the probabilities from the REM with the probability construction that 
includes private information acquisition in the IAM 
Pi = ay \  + (1 -  a )(l -  y hb) and p[ = ay'g + (1 -  a )( l -  y 'b)
p,* -  p\ = « (rs* -  r\ ) -  (1 ■- a)(n‘ -  rl)
Substituting the probabilities from the REM model into the necessary condition from 
Lemma 7 yields
- p l )  + Q - p i ) ' ]
U'(S'2L + B'2)
° i ( p h\ - p ! ) - p ! Ju - r i J U'(S^H + B’)
As p \  = a y hg + ( \ - a ) ( \ - y hb)
r hg = p \ - i + a  + r i  ~ a r hb and i - r hg = p ! + a + y i  - a y hb
. . h  hI PComparing — -— and — first by numerator and then by denominator, I find that 
1 - y \ 1 - P i
p \  - 1 + a  + y l  -  ay l  < p lx‘ and p* + a  + y£ -  ay'b > 1 -  p i , hence
. . h  hr g < Px
i - r i  i - p \
As the contracts are the same the RHS is the same, I can now compare cr£ with
( p i - p ' n ^ + d - p i )  Pf u '[s *(l )]
1-Pi*
r &2 ( p t  - p j )  + ( \ - p l)  
I < r Z i p i - p \ ) - p [ 1 — y 1v r s j
U'(S*L + B *)
(REM)
(IAM with cost)
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To do this I need to sign the derivative
da .
i - r . ‘
I obtain this derivative by taking the implicit derivative of the function
r*
° i { P i - p [ ) - p [  A l ~ K  J U'(%H + Bm2)
U'(S*L + B*) with respect to /   ^• g
1 — v 1
\  r  s  y
which is a
constant. I refer to as “ A ” in the remainder of the
proposition.
c  d a  2For a  I  > <Tj
y* ^
• g
1 —r J V r  * J
<0
dA
d a da.
dA
l - r
d a 2 - e r f C p ? - p ! ) ~ p !
(Pi - p !)
dA
P  i 
l - P l
P i
l - F i
Z_ p L X
1 - r f
r  \  
P i
1 ~ P i
(  h \
P i
i - P i
H r f O ^ - p . V p , ' ] 2
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d a l
f  \  
• 8
i - r !
( - o f  (p ! -  p ! ) + 1 -  p ! ) ( - o f  (p ! - p i ) -  pi
( - o f  ( p t - p l ) - p i K p ! - p l )  
Algebraically then, the sign of
- ( p ! - p l m - p l )
i - p !
(  h I k
& 2  \ P l  P i  )
Pt  '
vl - P t j
^ £ 2— js negative, hence I conclude that > o’, .
r \
p i  )
i - p i
In this section, I show that as long as information acquisition is not too costly, the 
agent collects information which has a positive impact on production in the economy. 
This result is interesting because if the information collection has any cost to it, the agent 
does not end up in the best case scenario with complete substitution in the costless case. 
Rather, with costly information collection, the principal prefers the partial substitution of 
effort randomization which still results in an increase in production relative to the 
scenario where the agent can only engage in public trading.
8. Conclusion and Implications for F urther Research
In this chapter I have attempted to analytically capture the notion of insider 
trading consistent with the definition provided by the SEC. The agent in this chapter has 
the opportunity to collect private information correlated with the liquidation value prior 
to deciding his trading strategy. Intuitively, one might expect that allowing the agent to 
collect private information would result in the agent shirking more often and selling his 
shares in the market and receiving full insurance. This chapter shows that in general, 
private information collection by the agent acts as a substitute for effort randomization. 
Hence when the information has a significant impact on the agent’s estimation value it
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alters the agent trading behavior in this model. The agent substitutes the effort 
randomization with private information collection and takes the high-cost action more 
often than in a model with public trading resulting in an increase in the overall 
production. In this chapter I provide analytically one possible explanation for why 
companies choose to compensate employees with tradable securities.
This chapter also opens up the avenue to empirically examine the impact of 
insider trading regulation on production. Most empirical studies have concentrated on the 
impact of insider trading by looking at the abnormal returns earned by insiders whereas 
this chapter’s focus calls for studying the impact of insider trading by looking at the 
production generated by the firm. One way to empirically test the conclusions of this 
chapter is by looking at the impact of insider trading regulation on production and/or 
investment of the firm. This chapter adds nuance to the regulation debate around insider 
trading and forces an examination of the tradeoffs that go along with prohibiting insider 
trading.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1 :1 will prove the above proposition in two parts - 1 will first show 
that if the agent has observed 0g and in equilibrium he does not trade his shares (Lemma
1), the contract that he receives from the principal is renegotiation proof.
The necessary condition for the second best contract with tradable securities given 
that the agent has exerted e2 and seen 0g with a probability cr* to be renegotiation proof 
can be calculated by substituting the value of
ft 2 = cr* [y H  + ( 1 - y  )L\ + (1 -  cr*)[(! - y b)H + yb L\ in the weak inequality from
Lemma 1 ( H - f t 2) y g ^ u'[S*2 l + b *2]> --------   — which then gives:
( L - f r 2) 1 - y  U W 2H  + Bl]
~ r b) + r b
^2(1 - r . - r b ) - < X - y b )
r*
1 - y
> -
& J
U'[S*2L + B2] 
U'[5*2H + B*2]
(H -  [<j*2y gH + <j 2L - cr2y gL + H - y bH -<j 2H + cr2ybH + ybL - a * y bL ]) y g ^  U'[S*L + B *2] 
(L -  [cr* y H + cr2L-cr*2y L + H  - y bH -  ct2H + a 2ybH  + ybL - c r 2yb L) 1 - y 1' U \S*2H  + B*2 ]
- a 2y \ H - L ] + a 2[ H - L \ - y b[ H - L \ - a 2yb[H-L] y  U'[S*2L+B*2\
> —
- m - L ] - a ; y g[H-L]+o-;[H-L]-yb[ H - L ] - a 2yb[ H - L ] l - y g U'[S*2H+B*2]
[H-L\[-cF2yg +cj2 - y b - o 2yb] y  U'[S*2L+B*2\
[ H - m - l - c J 2yg +a; - y b -<J2yb 1 - y g U’& H + B l ] 
Dividing by [H -  L ] yields
r,
1 - y
> -
s  J
U ’[d*2L + B2] 
U'[S2H + B*2\
* p 1^ y  — 1Substituting the value of cr* = —----- -— -  in the weak inequality above gives
1 ~ p \
Pi
Y*
1 - y
<
S
u '[s *h  + b :]
The above condition ensures that the agent is at a local maximum and hence has no 
incentive to trade with the market.
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A sufficient condition for this contract to characterize the case where the agent 
who has taken e2 and seen 6g with a probability cr* is at his maximum utility when he
continues to hold exactly 82 shares is for his expected utility function to be concave 
everywhere in 8 . This ensures that there is a global maximum and the agent does not 
have an incentive to change his contract at any point on his utility function.
If the agent’s expected utility function is concave everywhere in 8  there must exist a 
unique maximum. This holds if and only if
1. dEU/d8*2 > 0a t  8* = 0
2. d 2E U / d 28*<  0
To prove dEU/d82* >0a t  82 = 0
EU = y gU[S*H + B2 + (8* - y/)7t2] + (1 - y g)U[8*L + B\  + (8* - y/)7t2]
dEU/ d8* = y gU'[8*H - (8*  - y/)7t2 + B*][H - x 2] + ( I - y g)U'[8*2L - (82 -y/)7t2 + B* ][L - tt2] 
dEU/ d82 evaluated at 82 = 0 equals
y gU \ ¥ 7t2 + B'2][H -7 t2'] + { \ - y g)U\y/7t2 + B2*][L-  ft2]
= U'tyn2 + B*2 ][yg [ H - 7 t2] + { \ - y g )[L -  n 2 ]]
By assumption U' > 0
I need to prove that y g (H -  ft2) + (1 -  Xg ){L-7U2) is positive.
At cr* = 0 this expression equals 
y g[ H - y bH - ( l - y b)L\ + ( l - y g) [ L - y bH - ( l - y b)L]
=rg( 1 -  n  W  -  L) + a - y g )yb (l - h )
By assumption H  > L  which implies H - L >  0 and L - H  < 0
Also, y  (1 -  yb) > (1 -  y )yb as we know y g > yb, hence the expression is positive.
2. To prove that d 2E U / d 282 < 0
EU = y gU[82H  + B* + y/(H - n 2)] + (1 - y g )U[82L + B2 + y/(L -  ft2)] 
d 2E U / d 282 =
r sU ’[ S l H - ( S l +B 2‘] [ H - # 2]2 + ( l - r g)U"[6'2L - { 6 ; - W)ir2 + B ' ] [ L - ^ 2]2 
By concavity of U we know that U" < 0
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Clearly, [H -  k 2 ]2 and [L -  ?r2 ]2 are positive. 
Hence, d 2E U / d 2Sl  < 0
